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Existing scholarship does not account for why foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been 
increasing to many authoritarian countries in recent decades, with some authoritarian developing 
countries attracting levels of FDI similar to those in democratic developing countries. This 
dissertation argues that while authoritarian countries are in general more risky than democratic 
countries, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both 
“above” and “below.” Authoritarian regimes that sign international investment treaties signal 
FDI-friendly policies and are constrained from backtracking on those policies.  At the same time, 
authoritarian regimes that allow some degree of citizen participation in policymaking are 
constrained from deviating from FDI-friendly policies, which are generally preferred by citizens. 
In sum, it is hypothesized that authoritarian regimes that sign international investment treaties 
and maintain relatively high levels of citizen participation will attract the most FDI inflows. This 
hypothesis is tested using micro and macro level empirical evidence. Specifically, multilevel 
ordered probits of survey data on citizen preferences for FDI and statistical regressions of panel 
data on global FDI inflows are conducted. Estimation results confirm both the theoretical 
foundations and formal hypothesis of this dissertation: citizens in authoritarian countries view 
FDI inflows as welfare-enhancing and authoritarian countries with bilateral investment treaties 
and high levels of citizen participation attract the most FDI inflows. Additionally, results from an 
original survey of U.S. foreign investors reveal that multinational companies are aware of and 
value international investment treaties and freedom of association in host nations, thereby 
providing key primary evidence in support of the hypothesis. Finally, a comparative case study 
of Jordan and Syria further illustrate the micro-foundations of the argument. While both Jordan 
and Syria have signaled a dedication to liberal economic policies, Jordan has been the successor 
in attracting FDI inflows because of its participatory decision-making processes. This 
dissertation contributes to international political economy, international organization, and 
authoritarian political institution research by illuminating the domestic factors that provide 
credibility of compliance to international treaties signed by authoritarian countries. Previous 
literature has failed to address the variation of foreign investment inflows to authoritarian 
regimes and the role of compliance to international investment treaties in attracting these 
investment inflows to authoritarian countries. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Why are multinational companies investing in authoritarian countries? In the past two 
decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) to authoritarian countries increased by a slightly faster 
rate than to democratic countries1. FDI inflows to authoritarian regimes increased by close to 20 
percent between 1990 and 2008, while investments to developing democracies increased by 18 
percent. Figure 1 below highlights how authoritarian countries are now attracting similar levels 
of FDI as democracies2.  
                                                 
1 According to the World Bank (2011), foreign direct investment is defined as “net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting interest in or management control over an enterprise operating in 
an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital, as shown in the balance of payments.” In this 
analysis, a regime is defined as authoritarian if at least one of the following conditions hold: the 
chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, the 
incumbents will have or already have held office continuously by virtue of elections for more 
than two terms or have held office without being elected for any duration of their current tenure 
in office, and until today or until the time when they were overthrown they had not lost an 
election (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). 
2 Inflows of foreign direct investment as a percent of gross domestic product to democratic and 
authoritarian countries between 1970 and 2008 present a similar trend with both regimes 
attracting comparable levels of investment. See Figure 20 in Appendix A. 
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Figure 1 Average FDI Inflows (Current US Dollars) to Democratic and Authoritarian Countries3 
 
Even more striking, resource rich countries do not constitute the majority of FDI flows. Oil rich 
states make up less than twenty percent of the sample4. Rather, non-resource rich countries such 
as China, Thailand, Singapore, and Lebanon have received 53 percent of FDI inflows to 
authoritarian countries since 1970.  
Recent scholarship overwhelmingly predicts that foreign investors invest in countries 
with strong property rights in order to ensure their assets are protected. Yet, more and more 
multinational companies are choosing to invest in authoritarian regimes with notoriously weak 
property right protections. Data indicates that the rule of law is low and stagnant in authoritarian 
countries in the past decade (see Figure 21 in Appendix A)5. Also, the rule of law remains 
                                                 
3 Data is from World Bank (2011) and regime type is classified according to Cheibub et al 
(2009).   
4 Oil rich states are defined according to Ross (2012) as countries with annual oil and gas 
production valued greater than one hundred dollars per capita. 
5 The rule of law “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
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considerably lower than developing democracies. Thus, there is a risk of weak contract 
enforcement and property right protections in authoritarian countries.  
Although, in general, authoritarian governments are not reliable to respect the rule of law, 
authoritarian countries are attracting great inflows of foreign direct investment (as seen in Figure 
1). However, within this aggregate increase of FDI to authoritarian regimes there exists variation 
in inflows. Figure 2 below presents the variation of FDI inflows to authoritarian countries in 
2008.  
 
Figure 2 FDI Inflows (Current US Dollars) to Authoritarian Countries in 20086 
For example, some authoritarian countries, like Egypt, Jordan, Singapore, have been successful 
in attracting inflows of FDI (9.5 billion, 2.8 billion, and 8.6 billion US dollars respectively), 
while others, like Cuba, Myanmar, and Zambia, lag behind (with 24 million, 280 million, and 
940 million US dollars of FDI inflows respectively).  
                                                                                                                                                             
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (World Bank 
2010). 
6 Please note that I have omitted China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia from this graph to best depict 
(graphically) the variation in FDI inflows across the greater authoritarian world. In 2008, China, 
Russia, and Saudi Arabia had inflows of FDI of close to 40, 75, and 175 billion US dollars 
respectively.  
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This raises the question, how do some authoritarian nations lower the perceptions of risk 
to foreign investors? FDI inflows to democracies is of growing interest to scholars who analyze 
the role of good governance in attracting investment, yet, little scholarship analyzes how 
authoritarian regimes reduce foreign investors’ perceptions of risk. Drawing on international 
political economy, international organization, and authoritarian political institution theories, this 
dissertation seeks to explain the variation of FDI inflows to authoritarian regimes. Thus, the 
research question addressed in this dissertation is: What explains the variation of FDI inflows to 
authoritarian regimes? 
1.1 ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
I argue that foreign investors prefer to invest in authoritarian regimes that are constrained 
from “above” and “below.” The signing of an international investment treaty sends an initial 
signal to foreign investors of a regime’s willingness to promote liberal economic policies. 
Although participating in these international investment treaties entails financial and reputation 
costs, there is still a risk of noncompliance by the authoritarian leader. I argue that foreign 
investors are only assured of stability concerning the economic policies established in the 
international investment treaties in authoritarian signatories with high levels of citizen 
participation. Leaders in regimes with little citizen participation pursue rent-seeking policies as 
they receive little information from the greater populace and have little accountability to citizen 
preferences. In regimes with high levels of citizen participation, the authoritarian leader pursues 
welfare enhancing policies as he is informed on and constrained by citizen preferences. This 
societal feedback provides the authoritarian leader with information on the benefits of FDI as the 
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majority of citizens in authoritarian regimes associate FDI with growth and employment. Thus, 
authoritarian leaders in regimes with high levels of citizen participation will uphold FDI friendly 
policies. In sum, I hypothesize that authoritarian regimes with investment treaties and high levels 
of citizen participation will attract the most foreign direct investment as these regimes exhibit 
long-term commitments to liberal economic policies. Chapters 2 and 3 detail my theory on 
international and domestic institutions respectively.  
This dissertation will use a mixed method research design of statistical regressions and 
case studies to test my hypothesis and theoretical microfoundations. The purpose of the mixed 
methods is to ensure that this dissertation identifies both systemic patterns and causal 
mechanisms. The quantitative methods will produce general knowledge on variation of FDI in 
authoritarian countries, while the qualitative methods will provide contextual, in-depth 
knowledge of the concepts, cases, and causal mechanisms.  
First, I test my arguments using micro and macro level empirical evidence. Specifically, I 
conduct multilevel ordered probits of survey data on citizen preferences for FDI (Chapter 4) and 
statistical regressions of panel data on global FDI inflows (Chapter 5). Survey data highlights 
how citizens in authoritarian countries find FDI to be desirable. In fact, estimation results 
indicate that respondents in authoritarian countries associate increased inflows of FDI with 
increased confidence in government. This finding provides empirical support for the 
microfoundations of my theory that the public in authoritarian regimes supports FDI inflows.  
In addition, I present findings from my original survey of U.S. multinational companies 
conducted online during January through March 2013. The survey gathers primary evidence on 
business preferences for foreign investment by asking what national and international institutions 
secure property right protections and profitable operations for mulitnational companies investing 
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in authoritarian regimes. Specifically, I include questions on the role of investment treaties, 
political institutions and freedoms, business associations, and other non-governmental 
organizations in ensuring secure and profitable operations. Ultimately, the survey results show 
that multinational companies are aware of and value international investment treaties and 
freedom of association in host nations, thereby providing key primary evidence in support of my 
hypothesis. 
In Chapter 5, using cross-national data on FDI inflows to the developing world, I test my 
hypothesis using statistical regressions on panel data. Estimation results confirm my hypothesis: 
Authoritarian regimes that sign international investment treaties and have high levels of citizen 
participation attract the most FDI. Several robustness checks are conducted using alternative 
specifications of FDI inflows, the independent variables, the sample, and the estimation method. 
Also, I test and account for endogeneity and alternative hypotheses. All results are robust in 
supporting my hypothesis.  
Last, I conduct an illustrative case study of Jordan and Syria to further understand and 
develop the theoretical foundations (Chapter 6).  The selection of Jordan and Syria is based on 
the most-similar case research design as Jordan and Syria are both Middle Eastern countries with 
similar levels of economic development and bilateral investment treaties. Jordan and Syria do 
differ on one key element: citizen participation. Thus, the case study analysis uses both 
quantiative and qualitative evidence to uncover how two countries with similar international 
investment commitments attract FDI inflows. As hypothesized, the constraints on the 
authoritarian leader play a decisive role in the effectiveness of BITs in attracting foreign direct 
investment.  
 7 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF DISSERTATION 
The significance of this dissertation is threefold. First, it addresses a gap in the 
international political economy literature on the variation of FDI inflows to authoritarian 
countries. Current literature primarily compares democratic and authoritarian countries in their 
ability to attract FDI inflows without disaggregating the factors within specific regimes that 
contribute to this phenomenon (Jensen, Bigaliser, Li, Malesky, Pinto, Pinto, and Staats 2012). 
Democratic and authoritarian countries have unique political environments and risks, so it is 
important to examine the different mechanisms through which the regimes establish credibility to 
foreign investors. This dissertation builds on Chandra and Rudra (2011) to analyze the domestic 
factors that explain the variation of FDI inflows to authoritarian countries.  
Second, this dissertation provides theoretical and empirical evidence on how and when 
international treaties signed by authoritarian countries are credible. In particular, I find that 
citizen participation plays a key role in ensuring policy stability to international investment 
treaties in force in authoritarian regimes. As such, this dissertation analyzes compliance from a 
new and nuanced perspective by focusing on how citizen participation shapes and determines 
policy stability as opposed to how formal political institutions affect aggregate political risk 
measures—which are broad, imprecise measures of the constraints on authoritarian leaders and 
risks involved in investing in authoritarian regimes.  
Finally, I present and analyze micro level evidence on citizen and foreign investor 
preferences concerning foreign direct investment. While research on preferences for trade is 
abundant, the international political economy literature fails to provide strong empirical evidence 
or theoretical understanding of preferences for foreign direct investment. In addition, my original 
survey work on the experiences and preferences of managers in multinational companies takes 
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the new approach of incorporating investors as active participants in analyzing the determinants 
of FDI flows (Jensen, Bigaliser, Li, Malesky, Pinto, Pinto, and Staats 2012). This survey work 
provides strong primary evidence in support of the microfoundations of my theory.  
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2.0  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ROLE OF BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 
International political economy research highlights how foreign direct investment (FDI) entails 
the risk of the host government reneging on the agreed terms of business (Vernon 1971). Before 
investing, multinational companies can negotiate the terms of their investment freely with 
governments—if the multinational walks away, it does not lose any money or assets. However, 
after an initial investment is made, multinational companies must account for the costs they have 
already incurred in future negotiations or disputes. After foreign investors acquire these sunk 
costs, governments gain bargaining power. Therefore, foreign investors have concerns about host 
governments who are not reliable to uphold FDI friendly policies.   
Because of these sunk costs involved in FDI, foreign investors are averse to political risk. 
Political risk is defined as government interference in business operations and includes risk to 
property, contracts, and policy (Kobrin 1979). The greater the chance of political acts, decrees, 
or policies adversely affecting business operations, then the greater the political risk of the host. 
Politically risky countries have higher probabilities of contract violations, expropriations or 
nationalizations, and other ex-post policy changes by the government (Jensen, Malesky, and 
Weymouth 2012: 2). As a result, high levels of political risk can result in a loss of profit for 
multinational companies. Low risk is critical to foreign investors because they want to protect 
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their assets from expropriation and prevent contract violations and ex-post policy changes by the 
government.  
Research shows that developing democracies attract more FDI than authoritarian 
countries because their strong governance infrastructure reduces opportunistic behavior by the 
government (Daude and Stein 2007, Jensen 2003, Globerman and Shapiro 2002, Jensen, 
Biglaiser, Li, Malesky, Pinto, Pinto, and Staats 2012)7. Specifically, democracies have less 
political risk than authoritarian regimes because of their governance institutions and strong 
property rights protections (Jensen 2003, Jensen 2008). Democratic institutions “collectively 
serve to strengthen the rule of law and secure private property rights” (Li 2006: 64). Thus, secure 
property rights are most often found in democracies (Li 2006)8. As a result, scholars argue that 
investors should be attracted to democratic regimes over authoritarian regimes because of the 
security and credibility of democratic institutions9.   
                                                 
7 Oneal (1994) is the first article to use quantitative evidence to explore the relationship between 
regime type and foreign direct investment. He finds an insignificant relationship between regime 
type and FDI inflows, although profits for multinational companies are higher in authoritarian 
regimes. 
8 Data from the World Bank’s (2010) World Governance Indicators verifies that the rule of law 
in authoritarian regimes is consistently lower than the rule of law in democracies. Overall, the 
average rule of law, in developing democracies is -0.01, while it is -0.70 in authoritarian 
countries. (WGI scales the rule of law from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating a stronger 
rule of law.) Additionally, the rule of law in authoritarian countries is stagnant over time. In over 
ten years, the average rule of law in authoritarian countries remains consistently around -0.70, 
revealing little improvement in protecting property rights over time. See Figure 21 in Appendix 
A. 
9 It is important to note that even the literature highlighting how authoritarian regimes can be 
attractive for FDI, concedes that democracies’ strong property rights protection is attractive for 
foreign investors. For instance, only after controlling for property right protection are 
democracies associated with a reduction in FDI (Li and Resnick 2003). Therefore, protection of 
property rights is a great priority for foreign investors.  
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2.1 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
However, there is evidence that authoritarian regimes may be able to reduce their 
political risk. International agreements provide contractual frameworks supporting liberal 
economic policies, thus providing foreign investors some assurance of a commitment to these 
policies (Buthe and Milner 2008, Fang and Owen 2011, UNCTAD 2007). The dissemination by 
and transparency of information in international institutions facilitates the identification, 
monitoring, and punishment of those not complying with the rules or contracts (Buthe and 
Milner 2008, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002, Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008). Further, 
signing an international agreement subjects the signatory nation to an international audience 
(Fearon 1997). States, multinational businesses, and international institutions monitor the 
signatory nation’s compliance to the international agreement in order to develop accurate 
expectations as to the signatory’s commitment to liberal economic policies and respect for 
international agreements. Noncompliance to international agreements has international 
reputational and financial effects as these international actors, upon learning of contract 
violations, can create negative publicity about the signatory, reduce their future investment into 
the signatory, or demand financial or legal retribution (Allee and Peinhardt 2011, Fang and 
Owen 2011).  
In particular, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) establish the terms for foreign direct 
investment (Hallward-Driemeier 2003, Rosendorff and Shin 2011). BITs involve direct 
negotiations between countries on dispute resolution mechanisms, compensation for 
expropriation, and investment entrance and profitability (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006, 
Hallward-Driemeier 2003, Neumayer and Spess 2005). Dispute resolution provisions vary across 
BITs, especially in the specification of international or domestic courts for arbitrations; however, 
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international arbitration centers like the International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris are included in the 
majority of BITs globally. BITs also provide transparency on the rights of the foreign investor. 
For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2007) 
explains that “Most BITs include the standard of fair and equitable treatment” (xii), in addition to 
clauses on the transfer of funds, the entry of foreign nationals, and protection during war or civil 
disturbances. Overall, BITs are intended to secure foreign investors’ assets through agreeing on 
the rights and treatment of investors and setting up terms for compensation and conflict 
resolution (UNCTAD 2007).  
Although there is conflicting research on the effectiveness of BITs, overall, strong 
support for BITs attracting FDI exists (see Allee and Peinhardt 2011 for similar discussion). For 
example, some scholars provide evidence that BITs do not influence inflows of FDI (Yackee 
2007). However, several authors attribute the conflicting conclusions to different sample sizes 
and empirical methods used in each study. In particular, much of the literature only accounts for 
FDI outflows from developed countries (Aisbett 2007, Desbordes and Vicard 2009, Hallward-
Driemeier 2003, Kerner 2009, Salacuse and Sullivan 2005, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011). 
This sample greatly reduces the number of observations. Furthermore, several studies, such as 
Hallward-Driemeier (2003), use dyadic data. Neumayer and Spess (2005) explain that the use of 
the dyadic data limits the sample size and ignores the signaling effect or spillover effects of BITs 
in attracting investment. After running their panel model of 120 countries from 1970 to 2001, 
they find that BITs do attract FDI. Buthe and Milner (2009) confirm this positive relationship 
between BITs and inflows of FDI with a dataset of 122 developing counties over 31 years. 
Furthermore, in regards to authoritarian countries, Rosendorff and Shin (2011) provide evidence 
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that BITs are especially effective in attracting FDI inflows to authoritarian countries (compared 
to democratic developing countries). 
2.2 ARGUMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AS A 
CREDIBLE SIGNAL 
I argue that signing a BIT plays a critical role in credibly signaling to foreign investors 
that the signatory countries are dedicated to promoting and protecting liberal economic policies 
(Neumayer and Spess 2005, Kerner 2009). BITs provide all foreign investors access to 
information on national policies relating to investment and property rights. As international 
agreements, BITs are highly visible and accessible contracts— texts are available on the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s website and many nations publicize BIT 
signings in the national media (Buthe and Milner 2009: 184). Signing a BIT signals economic 
openness and friendliness to foreign investors10.  
This signal of a host country’s FDI friendly policies is especially important for 
authoritarian regimes. Generally, authoritarian regimes are considered non-transparent 
(Rosendorff and Shin 2011), so the BIT plays a vital role in communicating host country 
investment policies to foreign investors. The international agreement provides transparency on 
the rights of the foreign investor and liberal economic policies of the host.  
                                                 
10 The strength of this signal increases as countries sign treaties with many signatories because of 
the increase in the visibility (and information flows) of the dedication to FDI friendly policies. 
Allee and Peinhardt (2011) explain, “Governments that sign multiple treaties may be able to send 
a more effective signal, and this accumulation of numerous treaties demonstrates a stronger 
general commitment to protect investment and to promote a healthy investment climate for all 
foreign investors” (404).    
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Signing a BIT also signals a dedication to pursuing liberal economic policies to a 
domestic audience. Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2002) explain that signing an 
international treaty sends a signal to domestic audiences of the government’s policy decisions. In 
the case of a negative shock (ie, a decline in a country’s economic performance), this domestic 
signal is critical in assuring citizens that the government was/is pursuing strong economic 
policies.  
Signing a BIT is a credible signal as it is not a costless venture- there are financial and 
reputation costs associated with noncompliance to a BIT11. Violating the terms of a bilateral 
investment treaty is associated with financial costs if violators are taken to court (thereby 
involving court fees) and if financial damages are then demanded. Foreign investors do use the 
mechanisms established within the BITs to secure their rights and ensure proper compensation 
for contract violations as one hundred fifty-six investor-state disputes have entered the ICSID 
(Alle and Peinhardt 2010). One example case is when the ICSID awarded Desert Line Projects, 
LLC monetary compensation for a breach of contract by the Republic of Yemen in 2008 (Desert 
Line Projects, LLC v. Republic of Yemen 2008). Desert Line Projects, LLC entered into a 
contract with the Yemeni government to build roads. However, after the majority of construction 
was completed, the Yemeni government failed to make payments for services rendered. In 
response, Desert Line Projects, LLC brought claims of a BIT violation to the ICSID. 
Subsequently, the ICSID ruled in favor of Desert Line Projects, LLC.  
                                                 
11 In addition, Kerner (2009) discusses the ex-ante costs associated with signing a bilateral 
investment treaty. Signing BITs affects (1) the creation and implementation of domestic laws and 
(2) the treatment, protections, and competition of domestic and preexisting foreign investors 
(Kerner 2009: 79-80).   
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Additionally, as discussed previously, violating an international agreement is also 
associated with reputational effects. In regards to violating a BIT, Alle and Peinhardt (2011) test 
the reputational effect of the ICSID and find a loss in inflow of FDI associated with nations 
taken to the ICSID. Thus, government actions and policy decisions after signing a BIT can affect 
future inflows of FDI. Ronald Lauder’s experience investing in the Czech Republic exemplifies 
the reputational effects of signing and subsequently violating a BIT. Although protected under 
the Czech Republic-U.S. BIT, Lauder’s Central European Media Enterprise’s (CME) contract 
was violated by Vladimir Zelezny’s Czech Media Council (see Kerner 2009, Franck 2005 for 
details). After the contract was broken, Lauder publically denounced investing in the Czech 
Republic in the NY Times, Washington Post, and a Congressional Senate Hearing (Kerner 2009, 
Franck 2005, U.S. Congress 2000).  
2.3 RISK OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
However, BITs alone are not effective in attracting the most foreign direct investment 
inflows to authoritarian countries because of a continued risk of noncompliance. I argue that the 
aforementioned international financial and reputational costs are insufficient to ensure a credible 
commitment by authoritarian governments.12 This risk of noncompliance is associated with the 
weak governance institutions within certain signatory authoritarian nations—the domestic 
                                                 
12 My argument contrasts sharply with Rosendorff and Shin (2011) who indicate that 
authoritarian countries import stronger governance institutions when signing a BIT, thereby 
attracting FDI to that host country. Rosendorff and Shin (2011) fail to account for compliance to 
BITs signed by authoritarian governments. Other scholars, such as Tobin and Rose Ackerman 
(2011), explain that the effectiveness of BITs in attracting FDI inflows depends on the strength 
of domestic institutions of the signatory.  
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constraints on the authoritarian leader play an important role in the effectiveness of the BIT in 
attracting FDI13. All authoritarian leaders do not necessarily sign international agreements with 
the intention to comply (Vreeland 2008). BITs have financial and reputational costs (Allee and 
Peinhardt 2011) but this does not necessarily threaten the authoritarian leader’s power.  
Assuming he is a rational actor, the authoritarian leader will weigh the costs of 
noncompliance with the benefits of noncompliance. If violating the BIT results in a lucrative 
product, beyond the international reputational and financial costs, he will choose to violate. 
Underdal (1998) explains that a party will comply with an international agreement “If, and only 
as long as, expected marginal abatement costs minus any implementation benefits are lower than 
expected marginal damage costs plus any sanction costs incurred by defecting” (9). An 
authoritarian leader can gain power and resources from expropriation and other violations of the 
                                                 
13 Weak legal provisions within certain BITs signed by authoritarian governments could also 
increase the risk of noncompliance. BITs signed by some authoritarian countries have weak legal 
provisions, so there is not necessarily an international court to uphold the terms of the agreement. 
Allee and Peinhardt (2010) find evidence that signatories do not insist upon the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes in their BITs with countries that “have poor 
legal institutions or unstable political systems. In other words, international arbitration through 
ICSID is not a substitute for poor domestic institutions” (3). Without access to the ICSID in 
these nations, investors face high transaction costs and uncertain domestic legal environments. 
Data from Allee and Peinhardt (2010) indicates that the strength of enforcement procedures is 
realtively weak in BITs signed by authoritarian governments. They have an average strength of 
enforcement provisions score of 1.4 out of 3 (compared to an average of 1.7 in BITs signed by 
two democracies). Twenty percent of the time, BITs signed by authoritarian regimes do not use 
the ICSID, while democracies use the ICSID close to 95 percent of the time. BITs signed by 
authoritarian regimes do not necessarily contain the strong legal provisions with international 
courts that would ensure a credible commitment. However, the overwhelming majority of BITs 
signed by authoritarian countries do include international courts for arbitration (eighty percent 
specify the ICSID), so it is predicted that the strength of enforcement procedures specified by the 
bilateral investment is not illustrative in predicting compliance to BIT provisions. The lack of 
variation in dictating the ICSID as the arbitration court reduces its power in predicting FDI 
inflows. In addition, the arbitration procedures specified in the BIT does not address domestic 
factors that affect an authoritarian leader’s compliance to the rule of law. Empirical results 
confirm the ineffectiveness of strength of enforcement procedures in attracting FDI to 
authoritarian countries with BITs in force. See Table 26 in Appendix C. 
 17 
treaty (Li 2009a). Olson (1993) further verifies that authoritarian rulers “have an incentive to 
extract the maximum possible surplus from the whole society and to use it for his own purposes” 
(569). Thus, it is expected that noncompliance will be relatively higher in authoritarian countries. 
Empirical research verifies that authoritarian countries do comply less with international 
agreements than democratic countries (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002, Dai 2005). In 
general, without the institutional constraints found in democracies, authoritarian governments 
have trouble ‘tying their own hands’ (Haber et al 2003, Olson 1993, North 1990). Thus, signing 
an international agreement with an authoritarian regime entails a high risk of noncompliance. 
This risk of noncompliance reduces the reliability of the BIT commitment. 
Foreign investors prefer to invest in countries that are reliable in upholding international 
contracts (Allee and Peinhardt 2011). Even if foreign investors are eventually compensated for 
BIT violations through court proceedings, they are averse to investing in countries with high 
levels of noncompliance as this noncompliance can be associated with disruptions to business 
and profit, short-run financial losses, and lengthy legal proceedings (See ICSID case decisions 
that describe claimants’ allegations and injuries). For example, in Lauder’s case against the 
Czech government described earlier, CME sought 527 million dollars in damages and 200 
million dollars in interest and other penalties, while the international arbitration panel awarded 
CME only 353 million dollars from the Czech government (Green 2003).  
Ultimately, the international political economy research fails to address when 
authoritarian regimes are reliable in upholding international investment agreements. Bilateral 
investment treaties are critical in initially attracting foreign investors, but they are not sufficient 
to attract the highest levels of FDI to authoritarian regimes. This dissertation uncovers how 
institutional variation within authoritarian regimes affects the credibility of BITs in attracting 
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foreign direct investment. Specifically, I build on Chandra and Rudra (2011) to look beyond 
formal, power institutions within authoritarian regimes and examine the role of societal feedback 
in constraining a dictator’s ability to make erratic, opportunistic decisions on investment policies. 
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3.0  DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
Scholarly work shows that the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties in attracting FDI 
inflows depends on the domestic institutional environment of the host government (Desbordes 
and Vicard 2009, Hallward-Driemeier 2003, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011). As Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman (2011) explain, “BITs may be touted as a way to avoid the risks of local legal 
and political institutions, but … their main role for developing countries is to lend credibility to 
an otherwise favorable domestic environment” (6). Regimes with weak domestic institutions 
cannot reduce all political risk by signing a BIT.  
Authoritarian leaders without institutional constraints are likely to pursue rent-seeking 
policies, like expropriations, that threaten a foreign investor’s assets and security (Li 2009a, 
North and Weingast 1989, Weymouth 2011). These leaders pursue policies in their own self-
interest as they have little accountability to (or knowledge of) public preferences. Expropriation 
or nationalization can benefit the leader by providing him immediate access to resources or 
revenue (Li 2009a). Therefore, there is a great risk of violations of the BIT property right 
policies in these regimes.  
Regimes with constraints on authoritarian leaders exhibit less volatile, opportunistic 
decision-making (Tseblis 1995, Chandra and Rudra 2011). Traditionally, institutional constraints 
associated with policy stability were measured through formal institutions of power, or veto 
players (Tseblis 1995, Henisz 2004). A regime with many veto players needs many actors to 
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agree and compromise for a policy change. So, policy stability is associated with a greater 
number of veto players. 
Yet, formal political institutions in authoritarian regimes do not effectively reduce radical 
policymaking by authoritarian leaders; the legislature and political parties are exclusive, 
nonbinding, and intended for cooptation (Chandra and Rudra 2011, Wright 2008, Magaloni 
2008)14. For example, Wright (2008) and Lust-Okar (2005) describe the legislature as a forum to 
reward and challenge opposition groups throughout the authoritarian world, such as in the 
Dominican Republic, Malawi, Morocco, and Jordan. Instead of constraining the authoritarian 
leaders, the legislature was used by the leader to further advance and secure power. Current 
research shows that formal political institutions do not effectively constrain authoritarian leaders: 
Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth (2012) find an insignificant relationship between the presence 
of a competitive legislature and expropriation risk. Their results indicate that foreign investors do 
not view the presence of a competitive legislature as effective in reducing the risk of 
expropriation. Investors are not assured that their assets will be protected when an authoritarian 
regime has a legislature or political parties as these formal institutions are not associated with 
stability in authoritarian regimes (Mishler and Hildreth 1984). 
                                                 
14 Classical authoritarian institutional research further discusses the inability of formal political 
institutions to constrain authoritarian leaders (see for example, Friedrich and Brzeinski 1961). 
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3.1 ARGUMENT: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AS A CONSTRAINT 
ON AUTHORITARIAN LEADERS 
Instead, building on Chandra and Rudra (2011), I argue that authoritarian regimes with 
higher levels of informal, unconstrained citizen participation in decision-making are associated 
with greater policy stability15. Chandra and Rudra (2011) explain that citizen participation in the 
policymaking process increases the information available to the head of government as partisans 
(political leaders, citizens, associations, administrators, technocrats, etc.) negotiate and 
compromise. As the authoritarian leader learns of the policy consequences, he will adopt “safe, 
incremental policy proposals” (Chandra and Rudra 2011: 3). Although citizen participation is 
more advanced in democracies, some authoritarian regimes exhibit relatively high levels of 
citizen participation (Chandra and Rudra 2011, Leib and He 2006, Dryzdek 2009). In these 
authoritarian regimes, societal feedback provides a constraint on an authoritarian leader’s myopic 
                                                 
15 Most classifications of authoritarian regimes rely on formal political institutions (Levitsky and 
Way 2002, Diamond 2002, Magaloni 2008, Gandhi 2008) or executive power structures (Geddes 
2003, Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Diamond (2002) explains the reliance on formal institutions 
in classifying authoritarian regimes: “While contestation in the judiciary and the mass media is 
hard to quantify, contestation in elections and legislatures does allow for more structured 
comparison” (29). Despite the quantifiable merits of classifying regimes by formal political 
institutions, the data increasingly shows little variation in these institutions over time. This is 
confirmed by Diamond (2002): Virtually all hybrid regimes in the world today are quite 
deliberately pseudodemocratic, ‘in that the existence of formally democratic political 
institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the 
reality of authoritarian domination’” (24). Additionally, formal political structures do not capture 
other constraints on the dictator, like civic organization and participation. Howard and Roessler 
(2006) explain how in authoritarian countries, “Widespread public mobilization can also play a 
crucial role in the opposition’s ability to challenge the incumbent,” (372). The ability of citizens 
to mobilize captures the representativeness and inclusiveness of a regime, thereby measuring 
constraints on authoritarian leaders’ decision-making. 
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and radical behavior16. Authoritarian leaders are sensitive to this information because they want 
to thwart rebellion and maintain stability (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Romero 2004, Chandra 
and Rudra 2011). As these leaders learn from and listen to the information provided by their 
constituents, they derive support through their participatory law making and welfare enhancing 
policies (as opposed to maintaining power by coercion)17. 
In authoritarian regimes with citizen participation, citizens can and do organize for 
economic purposes and issues18. Citizen economic groups include business and labor 
                                                 
16 Chandra and Rudra’s (2011) theory provides a distinct hypothesis from veto player theory. 
According to their theory, regimes with few veto players, but high levels of citizen participation, 
exhibit incremental policymaking. This result is opposite from what veto player theory would 
predict. Chandra and Rudra (2011) describe how their theory differs from veto player theory in 
two ways: “The veto player model emphasizes the veto power vested in formally designed 
political actors, while we ascribe importance to the ability of partisans to negotiate directly and 
indirectly (and formally and informally)… In the veto players literature, power (and specifically 
veto power) is the key driver of outcomes. By contrast, we emphasize the value of information” 
(fn 15). 
17 In order to stay in power, authoritarian leaders can either repress or provide concessions (such 
as allowing citizen participation in policymaking) (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). For example, 
Linz (2000) describes two types of dictatorships, “totalitarian” and “authoritarian” regimes. 
“Totalitarian” regimes rely on massive coercion to maintain power. All political participation 
and civil society organization are channeled and controlled by the central government. However, 
in “authoritarian” regimes, according to Linz (2000), leaders allow limited pluralism. State and 
society have some separation and thus certain interest groups are allowed to organize. These 
leaders remain in power by appeasing and maintaining the support of the organized coalitions. 
Ultimately, authoritarian leaders choose different survival methods based on their revenue 
sources and availability and the strength, size and institutionalization of their supporters and the 
opposition (Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010, Conrad 
2011). Although the different survival tactics (coercion, concessions) are not mutually exclusive, 
Linz (2000) highlights how certain regimes rely on coercive (or non-coercive) tactics more than 
the others.  
18 Citizen participation on economic issues and organization of economic groups allows for some 
citizen power, but it is less threatening than citizen mobilization for political purposes or 
organizations. For instance, in China, “The CCP has adopted inclusive policies toward members 
of non-critical realm, particularly private entrepreneurs and technical specialists, while 
continuing to exclude and repress those from the critical realm who push for democratization and 
liberalizing reforms” (Dickson 2003: 22). Inclusion of economic groups allows for an economic 
dialogue without the greater threat of a political dialogue. 
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associations and local community organizations, like homeowner associations19. For example, 
the business association literature highlights group mobilization for economic issues in Uganda, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Russia, China, and Morocco (Khadiagala 2001, Lucas 1997, Pyle 2006, 
Bianchi 1985, Kennedy 2009, Cammett 2005). Economic groups in these countries have 
successfully mobilized to protect property rights, endorse liberalization, and collaborate on 
business ventures (Khadiagala 2001, Lucas 1997, Pyle 2006, Bianchi 1985). Evidence from the 
World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (2005) in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia confirms this notion. In this survey, respondents in authoritarian countries find 
business associations of major and critical value (highest values on a five point scale) to 
lobbying the government and accessing critical information on domestic markets and 
government regulations. The organization and activities of these economic groups facilitates a 
critical exchange of information between the government and the greater community on 
economic policies and conditions (Schneider and Maxfield 1997)20.  
In addition to organizational activities, citizens in authoritarian countries are actively 
involved in economic policy through surveys, polls, conferences, forums, and workshops (Gao 
                                                 
19 Examples in China include the private business association, Self Employed Laborers 
Association (Nevitt 1996), and the homeowner association, Property Owners’ Committee 
(Ogden 2002). Interestingly, Dickson (2003) found that in China “A clear majority—almost 70 
percent—of private entrepreneurs believes business associations can influence policy” (160). 
20 Business associations conduct market supporting and market complementing activities across 
the developing world (Doner and Schneider 2000). Market supporting activities occur when 
“Associations push underperforming states to provide the public goods only states can provide: 
property rights, uncorrupt administration, and infrastructure” (Doner and Schneider 2000: 262). 
Market complementing activities include “Functions that overcome market failures of various 
sorts including imperfect and costly information, low investment in training, and the lack of 
coordination in investments” (Doner and Schneider 2000: 262). Business associations increase 
accountability, transparency, and information flows (Lucas 1997, Zhang 2007, Nugent et al 
2009, Maxfield and Schneider 1997, Moore 2001). 
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2012, Leib and He 2006, Ogden 2002, Romero 2004)21. A great example of citizen participation 
on economic issues in authoritarian regimes is participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting 
practices have been increasing across the world, even in authoritarian regimes (Pateman 2012, 
Sintomer et al 2010, Shah 2007). Participatory budgeting involves citizens and elected officials 
meeting and discussing resource constraints and allocations, including investment decisions 
(Shah 2007, Sintomer et al 2010). Originating in Latin America, participatory budgeting exists 
throughout the world and in authoritarian countries like Zimbabwe, Egypt, Tanzania, Cameroon, 
Armenia, China, and Russia (Shah 2007, Sintomer et al 2010). 
Chandra and Rudra (2011) explain that not all partisans may have access to and influence 
on political deliberation (15). However, I argue that in regards to policies relating to foreign 
direct investment, authoritarian leaders have an incentive to incorporate and listen to the wider 
populous. As these leaders remain in power through non-coercive tactics, they rely on achieving 
growth and employment enhancing policies to maintain public support. Thus, information flows 
from the public are critical to ensuring the leader can advance policies that will benefit the 
greater economy and populace. Domestic firms (competing with foreign firms) will be active in 
the political discussion, yet their protectionist preferences will not dominate as the leader has an 
incentive to pursue employment-enhancing policies. Another alternative hypothesis is that under 
conditions of civic freedom and deliberation the strength of labor groups will deter foreign 
investment. However, even in authoritarian regimes with high levels of citizen participation, 
labor rights remain low. For example, in authoritarian regimes with high levels of citizen 
                                                 
21 For instance, in 1987, Russia founded the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research on 
Socio-Economic Issues (VCIOM), which still regularly conducts surveys and research programs 
on citizen’s socioeconomic status, attitudes, and preferences. Although some authoritarian 
regimes restrict or manipulate public opinion research, many regimes do use and allow polling 
(Romero 2004). 
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participation, workers’ rights remain severely restricted with an average score of less than 1 (0.8) 
on the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset’s workers’ rights scale of 0 (severely 
restricted) to 2 (fully protected). Further, Kim and Gandhi (2010) find that institutionalized 
authoritarian regimes co-opt labor in exchange for peaceful relations. Thus, disruptions to 
businesses due to strikes and protests will be minimal in many authoritarian regimes that allow 
forums for citizen organization and deliberation. 
3.2 SOCIETAL FEEDBACK ON BENEFITS OF FDI 
I argue that as citizens and organizations in authoritarian regimes provide feedback on 
economic issues, the majority will support property rights protections and inflows of FDI. 
Citizens in authoritarian regimes view FDI as welfare enhancing as it is associated with upward 
mobility, economic growth, and favorable labor conditions (Linardi and Rudra 2012, Tseng and 
Zebregs 2002, Hanson and Rand 2006, Scheve and Slaughter 2004, TeVelde and Morrissey 
2004). The international political economy literature confirms that multinational companies 
provide their workers better wages, working conditions, and rights (Mosley and Uno 2007, 
Mosley 2011, Gorg, Strobl, and Walsh 2007, Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1996). Accordingly, a 
critical component of my theory is that citizens in authoritarian countries find FDI inflows to be 
desirable.  
Ultimately, authoritarian leaders receiving high levels information from partisans on 
foreign direct investment on will exhibit greater policy stability on FDI friendly policies as these 
leaders are informed of the benefits of FDI. In fact, Frye (2004) provides evidence that under 
conditions of civic participation in an authoritarian regime, business associations and other social 
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groups lobby the state to secure property right protections. Additionally, overall, the flow of 
information provides the authoritarian leader feedback on FDI policy preferences and 
consequences, leading to greater bargaining and compromise, and thereby reducing radical and 
volatile decision-making. 
3.3 FOREIGN INVESTORS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
I argue that foreign investors are attracted to these authoritarian regimes with high levels 
of citizen participation as this environment is associated with domestic policy stability. Research 
confirms that foreign investors prefer stable investment environments (Asiedu 2006, Busse and 
Hefeker 2007, Schneider and Frey 1985), as policy stability is associated with stronger property 
right protections and predictable economic policies (Weymouth 2011, Henisz 2004, Chandra and 
Rudra 2011). 
Foreign investors recognize and value the ability to organize and provide government 
leaders with policy information as MNCs themselves work and partner with local organizations 
that support liberal economic policies. For example, across the developing world, foreign 
investors participate in local business organizations and have foreign-based associations and 
institutions, like Chambers of Commerce (Egan 2010, World Bank 2005). Egan (2010) 
succinctly describes the roles and interactions between local and foreign organizations and 
investors in Latin America:  
A number of organizations act on behalf of multinationals in Latin America, providing an 
interface with policymakers. Chambers of commerce may lobby for changes in tax codes; 
industrial associations can identify barriers to smooth and efficient operations. Even 
individual connections between high-ranking bureaucrats and heads of multinational 
firms can provide conduits for policy pressure (10).  
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Regimes permitting citizen participation provide foreign investors greater opportunity to work 
with local civil society to advance and ensure policies advantageous to foreign investment and 
property right protection. Thus, a second critical component of my theory is that foreign 
investors are aware of and actively engaging with civil society in authoritarian countries. 
Policy stability is especially valuable to foreign investors investing in authoritarian 
regimes with BITs because investors want to ensure the FDI friendly policies in the BIT contract 
will be upheld over time. Stability to the BIT liberal economic policies attracts greater inflows of 
FDI as foreign investors in this environment feel secure that the policies protecting their 
investment will remain in place. Thus, the effectiveness of a BIT attracting FDI will increase in 
authoritarian regimes with policy stability.  
An alternative hypothesis would be that regimes with high levels of corruption would 
allow firms to swiftly gain access to government officials and influence over policymaking 
(Egger and Winner 2005), thus reducing the benefits of civil society organizations and networks. 
However, the vast majority of the international political economy evidence indicates that foreign 
investors are attracted to regimes with low levels of corruption (Benassy Quere et al 2007, Busse 
et al 2007, Habib et al 2002, Mathur and Singh 2013, Smarzynska and Wei 2000). Egger and 
Winner (2005) is the only article showing corruption attracts FDI inflows. However, upon close 
examination of their results, regions with many authoritarian countries (Asia, Africa) show a 
negative relationship between corruption and FDI inflows, while regions with few authoritarian 
countries (South America, Europe) exhibit a positive relationship (Egger and Winner 2005: 948). 
Therefore, corruption may be attractive to foreign investors only after a strong governance 
infrastructure exits because, in this situation, corruption greases the bureaucratic system. Yet, in 
 28 
countries with weak laws, corruption further contributes to the uncertainty of contract and 
property right protections. 
3.4 HYPOTHESIS 
Ultimately, I argue that foreign investors prefer to invest in regimes with stable, FDI 
friendly policies. A bilateral investment treaty sends an initial signal to the foreign investor that 
the signatory is dedicated to pursuing liberal economic policies. Foreign investors are then 
further assured of a long-term commitment to the BIT in regimes with citizen participation. 
Thus, my hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis: Authoritarian regimes with bilateral investment treaties and high levels of 
citizen participation will attract the most FDI, while authoritarian regimes with either no 
bilateral investment treaties or low levels of citizen participation will attract less (or no) FDI. 
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4.0  MICROFOUNDATIONS: CITIZEN AND BUSINESS PREFERENCES FOR FDI 
Using survey data, I explore and assess the theoretical microfoundations of my argument that 
citizens in authoritarian countries want inflows of FDI and that multinational companies value 
bilateral investment treaties and citizen participation when investing in authoritarian countries. 
Analyzing survey evidence is critical to understanding and directly measuring preferences for 
foreign direct investment- an issue understudied in international political economy research. 
Ultimately, this chapter provides strong micro-level evidence in support of the tenants of my 
theory.  
4.1 SURVEY EVIDENCE ON CITIZEN PREFERENCES  
First, I evaluate citizen support for foreign investment in authoritarian countries using survey 
data from the PEW Global Attitudes Project (2003 and 2007) and the Asia Europe Survey 
(ASES) (2001). The PEW Global Attitudes Project contains survey data for 52 developing 
countries across the world. The ASES survey provides data for survey respondents in seven 
developing Asian nations. Specifically, the PEW survey question is, “Is the influence of large 
companies from other countries very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in 
(survey country)?” The response ranges from one to four: very bad to very good, respectively. 
The ASES question is, “Could you tell me how much confidence you have in International Big 
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Business?” This question is coded from one to four: none at all, not much, quite a lot, and great 
deal, respectively. Table 28 in Appendix D lists the countries sampled in this survey. 
It is expected that citizens in authoritarian countries find FDI desirable as it is associated 
with economic growth and favorable labor conditions, thus a majority of respondents should 
indicate high confidence in international big business and a good influence of foreign companies. 
Figure 3 below provides support for this hypothesis that citizens in authoritarian regimes find 
FDI desirable. 
 
Figure 3 Citizen Preferences for FDI in Authoritarian Countries 
The overwhelming majority of survey respondents living in authoritarian countries selected that 
foreign companies are a good influence (68 percent) and that they have a lot of confidence in 
international big business (74 percent). Interestingly, the support for FDI by citizens in 
authoritarian regimes is higher than their counterparts in democratic countries (65 percent and 59 
percent support by citizens living in democracies in the PEW and ASES respectively).   
Next, I analyze the impact of FDI inflows on confidence in government in authoritarian 
countries. I theorize that citizens in authoritarian regimes find FDI to be desirable and therefore 
 31 
want the government to uphold property right protections and contracts for foreign investors. I 
predict that citizens in authoritarian regimes associate greater inflows of FDI with greater 
confidence in government because greater inflows of FDI are related to greater capacity by the 
government in attracting foreign investment and protecting private property rights. 
 The dependent variable, confidence in government, is collected from the World Values 
Survey Wave Four (2000) for 16 authoritarian countries (see Table 28 in Appendix D for list of 
countries in the sample). The specific survey question is “Could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in the government: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, 
not very much confidence or none at all?” The responses are coded from one to four: none at all 
to a great deal, respectively.  
 The independent variable of interest is inflows of FDI. This variable measures the total 
inflows of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP (World Bank 2011). It is expected that 
citizens in authoritarian countries associate inflows of FDI with greater government confidence, 
thus the coefficient on the democracy variable should be negative and statistically significant.  
I test my hypothesis using a multilevel, ordered probit with key controls at the individual 
and country level. At the individual level, I account for the respondent’s gender, education, and 
income (WVS 2000). At the country level, I control for GDP growth and life expectancy to 
capture economic success and level of development (World Bank 2011). To account for 
reporting bias, I include an objective measure. Rule of law is associated (objectively) with 
government confidence and therefore it serves as the objective measure (Kenyon and Naoi 2010, 
World Bank 2010). Thus, I estimate my model including this objective measure that is highly 
correlated with the subjective survey response to address potential reporting bias. The variable 
descriptions are in Appendix D, Table 29.  
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Table 1 Effect of FDI Inflows on Government Confidence in Authoritarian Countries: Multilevel 
Ordered Probit 
 
Base Model  
Government Confidence 
Full Model 
Government Confidence 
   
Objective Measure 0.293*** -0.088*** 
 (0.015) (0.020) 
Individual Level Indicators   
Male -0.026* -0.029* 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Education -0.056*** -0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Income  -0.046*** 
  (0.004) 
Country Level Indicators   
Inflows of FDI 0.128*** 0.103*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
GDP Growth  0.093*** 
  (0.003) 
Life Expectancy  -0.011*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Observations Level 1 24472 21543 
Observations Level 2 16 16 
Random Variance Level 1  0.146  0.144  
Model Deviance AIC  60891.87    52984.16  
Model Deviance BIC 60956.72  53071.92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1 provides robust support for my hypothesis. Inflows of FDI are positively and 
significantly associated with confidence in government for citizens in authoritarian countries. 
GDP growth is also associated with increased government confidence (this is corroborated in the 
literature, see Chappell (1990) for example). However, as citizens become more educated or 
wealthy, they have less confidence in government (see Cook and Gronke (2005) for similar 
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education results and Espinal et al (2005) for a discussion and empirical evidence on middle 
income citizens having less confidence in government than low income citizens).   
 To provide insight into the magnitude of the effect of FDI inflows on government 
confidence in authoritarian countries, Figure 4 below graphs the predicted probabilities of survey 
respondents indicating great confidence in government.  
 
Figure 4 Predicted Probabilities of Respondents who Indicate Great Confidence in Government 
 
Respondents in a country in the lowest quartile of FDI inflows (like Zimbabwe) have a predicted 
probability of 17 percent in selecting the highest confidence in government, while respondents in 
a country in the highest quartile (like Egypt) have a predicted probability of 26 percent. Overall, 
in authoritarian countries, survey respondents associate greater inflows of FDI with greater 
confidence in government, thereby lending strong support to the microfoundation of my 
argument that citizens find FDI inflows to be desirable. As governments advance policies that 
attract and sustain FDI inflows, they are pursuing policies that are preferred by the majority of 
the country. Thus, authoritarian leaders who rely on participatory and welfare-enhancing 
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policymaking can adopt FDI friendly policies to maintain support and confidence among the 
populous. 
These estimation results are robust to a different specification of the independent variable 
of interest (FDI inflows in current US dollars logged), the exclusion of the objective measure, 
and Marshall and Gurr’s (2008) classification for the sample. See Table 9, 10, and 11 in 
Appendix B for results.   
4.2 ORIGINAL SURVEY EVIDENCE ON BUSINESS PREFERENCES 
I conducted an original survey of U.S. multinational companies to gather primary evidence of 
business preferences for and experiences in investing in authoritarian countries. This survey 
addresses a gap in the political science literature as few studies use survey evidence to analyze 
how businesses assess and mitigate political risk (Biglaiser and Staats 2010, 2012). Furthermore, 
despite the burgeoning bilateral investment treaty research, few studies have sampled businesses 
on their perceptions of the utility and function of BITs (Buthe and Milner 2009).  
The survey population is multinational companies with headquarters in the United States 
that invest in developing countries. Language and data constraints inhibited me from collecting 
sample lists and survey data from non-U.S. companies. However, the U.S. makes up over twenty 
percent of worldwide foreign direct investment outflows, the largest percent of any country (for 
instance, the second highest is Japan at six percent) (UNCTAD 2011b). Thus, my survey is 
effective in gathering evidence on investor preferences from the most prominent home country 
actor in foreign direct investment flows. Additionally, the surveyed U.S. managers invest across 
the developing world, so the variation in host country location will provide evidence on how 
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investors mitigate political risk across different authoritarian regimes. Chief executive and 
financial officers and upper-level managers are the targeted respondents of my survey because 
they have the most information and knowledge regarding investment decisions (Biglaiser and 
Staats 2010).  
The source of the sample list is the Uniworld Business Publications Directory. Uniworld 
Business Publications provides contact information, investment locations, industry sector, total 
revenue, and number of employees for all U.S. multinational companies. This directory has been 
used in many academic publications (Biglaiser and Staats 2010, 2012, Dreiling and Darves 2011, 
Musteen, Rhyne, and Zheng 2012) and subscribers of Uniworld Business Publications include 
universities, business organizations (like Chamber of Commerce), libraries, and the U.S. 
government. 
I created an online version of my survey using Survey Monkey. When conducting the 
survey, I first sent an introductory script to each company with a listed email address. This script 
contained an introduction to the project, a letter from the Dean of the Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs, and a link to the survey. As the email list was fairly comprehensive 
(4601 out of 5112 companies listed) and representative (the difference in the mean of 
employment and sales values of all data and data with emails were minimal- less than one 
percent difference), I emailed my survey to all companies who had listed email addresses and 
chose not send the survey via the postal service.  
The survey starts with a consent script, following the University of Pittsburgh’s 
Institutional Review Board’s procedures. Survey questions then address what national and 
international institutions ensure secure property right protections and profitable operations for 
multinational businesses operating in authoritarian countries. Specifically, I ask about the role of 
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bilateral investment treaties, host country political institutions and freedoms, business 
associations, and other non-governmental organizations in ensuring secure property right 
protections and efficient, stable, and profitable operations for business managers investing in 
nondemocratic countries. Please see Appendix E.1 for a copy of the survey questionnaire.   
 Between January and April 2013, fifty-three individuals answered the survey, although 
only eighteen answered all the questions on investing in authoritarian countries. Twenty-one (of 
the fifty-three) respondents indicated that their companies do not invest in developing or 
authoritarian countries. Ninety percent of the respondents who indicated their company did not 
invest in authoritarian regimes cited a lack of customer base as the reason. However, forty 
percent also indicated government interference in business operations as another reason for the 
lack of investment in authoritarian regimes, thus lending support to the high levels of political 
risk in authoritarian countries. The response rate is the major limitation of the survey (please note 
that surveys to businesses have a notoriously low response rate of ten percent or less, see 
Biglaiser and Staats (2010) for an overview) and I hope to further develop this survey through 
the mail and phone in order to increase response rates.  
In general, the respondents were highly qualified and company size was evenly 
represented. Among the fifty-three respondents, only twenty percent did not have input in the 
decision of the company to invest abroad thereby highlighting that, overall, the respondents were 
actively involved in decision-making concerning investment decisions. Forty-three percent of the 
respondents worked for a company with an annual revenue range of fifty million dollars or less 
and fifty-eight percent of respondents’ companies had less than 500 full-time employees. Thus, 
the sample was fairly divided between small and large size companies. Please see Appendix E.2 
for summary tables of all survey answers. 
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This survey provides primary evidence on three key aspects of my theory: (1) the 
significance of bilateral investment treaties to multinational companies investing in authoritarian 
countries, (2) the significance of civil society organizations and associational freedoms to 
multinational companies investing in authoritarian countries, and (3) investor perceptions of 
citizen support for foreign investment in authoritarian countries. Overall, I find strong support 
for the theoretical foundations of my argument as multinational companies value BITs as a signal 
of liberal economic policies, associate freedoms of association with secure property right 
protections and profitable operations, and perceive strong support for the foreign investment by 
citizens in host authoritarian countries.  
First, I asked two questions concerning what domestic and international institutions were 
valuable in securing property right protections and profitable operations in the authoritarian 
country in which the respondent’s company has operations. Specifically, the question was: 
Currently how valuable to ensuring property right protections (or profitable operations) are the 
following for your company? The answer options were a five-point scale from not valuable to 
extremely valuable. Around fifty percent of respondents indicated business associations and the 
freedom of association as very or extremely valuable in ensuring both secure property rights and 
profitable operations; while, close to thirty percent of respondents indicated BITs as very or 
extremely valuable for these issues. This contrasts sharply with less than ten percent of 
respondents selecting an elected legislature as very or extremely valuable in ensuring profitable 
operations.  Figure 5 below provides detailed evidence on the percentage of respondents who 
selected very or extremely valuable in association with various institutions in protecting property 
and profit. 
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Figure 5 Value of Domestic and International Institutions in Securing Property Rights and Profit 
The answers to this initial question provide evidence in strong support of multinational 
companies awareness of and value for civil society organizations. Importantly, both measures of 
citizen participation (business associations and freedom of assembly) were more highly valued 
than the formal political institution of the legislature in both ensuring property right protections 
and profitable operations. However, the results to this survey question also highlight the inability 
of bilateral investment treaties to be a credible commitment of property right protections for 
many investors investing in authoritarian countries as only thirty percent of respondents found 
BITs to be very or extremely valuable in ensuring property right protections. 
 In order to further assess the significance of international investment treaties, I included a 
survey question on the value of BITs (signed by authoritarain countries in which the 
respondent’s company has operations) in signaling FDI friendly policies. The overwhelming 
majority (sixty-five percent) of respondents indicated that BITs are somewhat, very, or extremely 
valuable in signaling a signatory’s commitment to liberal economic policies (on a five point scale 
from not valuable to extremely valuable). Figure 6 highlights this statistic.   
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Figure 6 Value of BITs in Signaling a Commitment to Liberal Economic Policies 
Ultimately, the results of this survey indicate the power of BITs as a signaling device of liberal 
economic policies as opposed to a credible commitment of property right protections for 
multinational companies.  
The survey then included several questions on the respondent’s company’s experiences 
with various civil society organizations in authoritarian countries in order to further evaluate the 
significance of freedoms of association for foreign investors in their investments abroad. Figure 
7 below describes how often the respondent’s company works with business associations, non-
governmental organizations, and chamber of commerces.  
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Figure 7 How Often Businesses Work with Civil Society 
This figure highlights how the majority of multinational companies work with both business 
associations and civil society organizations very often (once a month or more) in authoritarian 
countries. Half of the respondents indicated working with business associations and chamber of 
commerces once a month, while nearly forty percent of respondents work with non-
governmental organizations every day. Furthermore, the survey reveals that a major purpose of 
the contact with business associations is establishing business and government networks in the 
host country. Half of the survey respondents indicated that working with business associations 
was very or extremely valuable in providing access to business networks and close to forty 
percent of the respondents found business associations very or extremely valuable in accessing 
government networks.  
Finally, I included a question concerning citizen support for foreign investment in 
authoritarian countries in order to provide additional evidence on citizen preferences for FDI. My 
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original survey results corraborate the survey results reported earlier from the PEW and ASES 
surveys: close to ninety percent of the respondents indicated moderate to very strong citizen 
support in the authoritarian country their company invests. Figure 8 below provides descriptive 
statistics on this question. 
 
Figure 8 Business Perceptions of Citizen Support for FDI   
Only a little more than ten percent of respondents indicate very weak or weak citizen support for 
foreign investment. Thus, in conjunction with survey reports and results in section 4.1, the data is 
consistent in showing strong citizen support for foreign investment in authoritarian regimes.  
4.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Overall, the primary evidence reported and analyzed in this chapter presents strong support to the 
microfoundations of my theory. Survey data from individuals living in and foreign investors 
investing in authoritarian countries indicates strong citizen support for FDI inflows. Further, 
evidence linking greater inflows of FDI with greater confidence in government shows that 
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citizens in authoritarian countries view attracting FDI as beneficial for their nations. These 
results highlight the foundations of my argument that if authoritarian leaders rule by 
participatory and welfare-enhancing policymaking they will, first, receive societal feedback on 
the benefits of FDI and, second, maintain confidence and support by pursuing FDI friendly 
policies.  
Survey results from my original survey of U.S. multinational companies provide 
preliminary evidence that foreign investors do value both BITs and citizen participation, the two 
factors I hypothesize attract FDI to authoritarian countries22. Foreign investors are aware of and 
actively involved in civil society in authoritarian countries. In fact, multinational companies cited 
both the freedom of assembly and business associations as very valuable in ensuring strong 
property right protections and profitable operations abroad. Additionally, instead of being a 
credible commitment to protecting property (only thirty percent of respondents associated BITs 
with being very or extremely valuable in protecting property rights), BITs are associated with 
signaling a host country’s dedication to liberal economic policies (over sixty percent of 
respondents indicated BITs are somewhat to extremely valuable in signaling liberal economic 
policies). This primary evidence on foreign investor preferences when investing abroad 
corroborates the foundations of my theory on the role of domestic and international institutions 
reducing political risk and attracting foreign investment to authoritarian regimes.   
 Ultimately, this analysis contributes to a gap in the international political economy 
literature on preferences for FDI in the developing world. Extensive literature on societal 
preferences for trade exists within the discipline (Rogowski 1987, Frieden 1991, Hiscox 2001) 
and Scheve and Slaughter (2004) evaluate perceptions of economic insecurity associated with 
                                                 
22 Please note the limited number of respondents. 
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FDI inflows, however little research addresses attitudes towards FDI in the developing world. 
Thus, my empirical findings play a key role in providing initial evidence on aggregate 
preferences for FDI in authoritarian countries. 
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5.0  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Regression analysis will be used to test the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes with BITs and 
high levels of citizen participation attract the most foreign direct investment inflows. It is 
hypothesized that BITs are most effective in attracting inflows of FDI in authoritarian regimes 
with high levels of citizen participation.  
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES   
Regime type is classified according to Przeowrksi, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi’s (2000) 
criteria. A regime is defined as authoritarian if at least one of the following conditions hold: the 
chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, the 
incumbents will have or already have held office continuously by virtue of elections for more 
than two terms or have held office without being elected for any duration of their current tenure 
in office, and until today or until the time when they were overthrown they had not lost an 
election (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). Specifically, the data is taken from 
Cheibub et al’s (2009) dataset, which builds on Przeworksi et al’s (2000) classification.23 
                                                 
23 Other measures of democracy correlate very strongly with this classification of 
authoritarianism. The correlation between Cheibub et al (2009)’s measure of regime type and 
Marshall and Gurr (2008)’s polity is 0.82. Ninety-five percent of the country years classified as 
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The dependent variable is inflows of FDI in current U.S. dollars (logged) (World Bank 
2011). The log of FDI inflows is the dependent variable in order to best capture the amount of 
investment; FDI as a percent of GDP reflects openness (Li 2009b).24 
The first independent variable of interest is operationalized as the total number of 
bilateral investment treaties in force (with any country) (UNCTAD 2011). The average number 
of bilateral investment treaties authoritarian countries have in force is close to 4 (3.72) and the 
standard deviation is close to 9 (8.77). In the past two decades, the number of BITs in force has 
increased tremendously. Figure 9 below captures this trend: 
 
Figure 9 Average Number of BITs in Force in Authoritarian Countries 
However, despite the great overall increase in BITs, there exists variation in the number 
of BITs in force among different authoritarian countries. Figure 10 highlights the variation in 
BITs in force in 2008.  
                                                                                                                                                             
authoritarian in Marshall and Gurr (2008) are also authoritarian according to Cheibub et al 
(2009). 
24 Robustness tests with FDI as a percent of GDP are conducted and results are robust. See Table 
14 in Appendix C. 
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Figure 10 Number of BITs in Force in Authoritarian Countries in 2008 
While China and Egypt have the most bilateral investment treaties in force (90 and 69, 
respectively), many authoritarian countries have very few BITs, such as Botswana (2), Iraq (1), 
Myanmar (2), and Zambia (2). Thus, while the total number of BITs signed is increasing overall, 
disaggregating this trend reveals variation among authoritarian countries in their willingness to 
enter into international investment contracts. 
Following Chandra and Rudra (2011), the second independent variable of interest, citizen 
participation, is operationalized by Marshall and Gurr’s (2008) PARCOMP. PARCOMP is 
defined as “the degree to which political participation is free from government control,” (69) and 
Marshall and Gurr (2008) explain that PARCOMP depends on civil interaction. PARCOMP is 
measured on a five-point scale with high values indicating high degrees of citizen participation. 
Specifically, the scale from one to five is defined as: repressive (no significant oppositional 
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activity permitted), suppressive (some organized opposition outside the government), factional 
(parochial or ethnic based factions), transitional (competing interests but not fully linked with 
broader interests), and competitive (stable and enduring political groups) (Marshall and Gurr 
2008)25.  
Citizen participation is not an alternative measure of democracy. In fact, the level of 
citizen participation varies across the democratic and authoritarian developing world. Table 2 
below presents cases of high and low citizen participation in democratic and authoritarian 
countries. In this analysis, the focus is on countries that are authoritarian (low levels of 
democracy in Table 2) but have relatively high levels of citizen participation (see highlighted 
box).  
Table 2 Citizen Participation and Democracy in the Developing World in 2008 
  DEMOCRACY 
  HIGH LOW 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION 
HIGH  
India (4) 
Lithuania (5) 
Mongolia (5) 
 
Russia (4) 
Jordan (4) 
Zambia (4) 
LOW  
Thailand (3) 
Pakistan (3) 
Ukraine (3) 
 
North Korea (1) 
Syria (1) 
Uzbekistan (1) 
** Citizen participation score (scaled 1 to 5) in parentheses  
                                                 
25 In the developing world, the level of citizen participation is not time invariant. For example, 
the average difference in PARCOMP scores in a country over ten years is close to half a point 
with a standard deviation of one point.  
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However, the theory on citizen participation constraining leaders is especially powerful in 
authoritarian cases because in these countries the rule of law is weak and formal institutions are 
often ineffective (as discussed previously). In fact, Chandra and Rudra (2011) find that the 
threshold for citizen participation affecting policy stability is low in authoritarian countries- even 
modest levels of citizen participation can greatly influence national decision-making processes.  
Unlike formal domestic institutions in authoritarian governments, the level PARCOMP 
varies across authoritarian regimes. Figure 11 below highlights the variation in citizen 
participation in authoritarian countries in 2008.  
 
 
Figure 11 Citizen Participation in Authoritarian Countries in 2008 
 
This figure contrasts sharply with the variation of legislatures in authoritarian countries. Figures 
22 and 23 in Appendix C indicate the number of country-years with differing modes of 
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legislature selection and levels of citizen participation. Between 1990 and 2008, regimes were 
almost evenly split between repressive, suppressive, and factional levels of citizen participation, 
while the overwhelming majority (71 percent) of these same regimes had elected legislatures.26 
In addition, Table 12 in Appendix C highlights the variation of citizen participation within 
categories of authoritarian regime type (civilian, military, royal) and countries with elected 
legislatures. The level of citizen participation provides a more nuanced measure of the 
constraints on the authoritarian leader than other measures of formal political institutions or 
power relations.  
Preliminary evidence provides support for the hypothesis that in authoritarian regimes 
with high levels of citizen participation, dictators exhibit lower levels of rent-seeking behavior. 
Figure 12 below highlights how authoritarian regimes with higher levels of PARCOMP have 
lower levels of expropriation (Li 2009a). 
                                                 
26 Other measures of formal institutions present similar trends. For example, since 1990, 56 
percent of authoritarian country-years have multiple parties in the legislature, while only 29 
percent and 15 percent have no legislature or the regime party only in the legislature, 
respectively (Cheibub et al 2009). Similarly, the overwhelming majority of authoritarian 
governments have no veto players (74 percent) (Henisz 2000).  
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Figure 12 Expropriation in Authoritarian Countries between 1960 and 1990 
PARCOMP is positively associated with policy stability27. As discussed previously, in 
regimes with high levels of citizen participation, leaders receive information on the policy 
preferences and consequences, thereby leading to incremental decision-making28. To test the 
determinants of policy stability, I estimate a fixed effects regression with PARCOMP as the 
independent variables of interest. The dependent variable, policy stability, is measured as the 
standard deviation of the growth rate, a widely accepted measure of stability in the political 
science literature (Henisz 2004, Quinn and Woolley 2001, Chandra and Rudra 2011). Higher 
values indicate greater policy instability (as the standard deviation of the growth rate is larger), 
thus the dependent variable is labeled as policy instability. Building on Chandra and Rudra 
                                                 
27 Please note that in authoritarian countries PARCOMP is not highly correlated with the rule of 
law (0.03).  
28 Citizen participation is a better measure of policy stability than political risk. Political risk is a 
broad measure that does not concisely capture policy stability; it also surveys additional 
environmental factors such as governance institutions, corruption, and conflict. Further, political 
risk includes measures that do not determine FDI inflows (military in politics, religion in politics, 
presence of a competitive legislature) (Busse et al 2007, Qian and Baek 2011, Jensen, Malesky, 
and Weymouth 2012). 
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(2011), I control for GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, trade, and veto players (World 
Bank 2011, Henisz 2004). Estimation results in Table 3 below highlight how PARCOMP is a 
key indicator of policy stability. 
Table 3 Determinants of Policy Stability in Authoritarian Countries: A Panel Regression 
 (Policy Instability) (Policy Instability) 
      
PARCOMP -0.623*** -0.477*** 
 (0.117) (0.122) 
GDP per capita  -1.145*** 
  (0.190) 
Primary School Enrollment  0.00358 
  (0.00635) 
Exports (% GDP)  -0.00267 
  (0.00762) 
Veto Players  -1.310*** 
  (0.455) 
   
Observations 2,364 1,894 
R-squared 0.013 0.054 
Number of countries 114 108 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The marginal effect of PARCOMP on policy instability is negative and statistically significant, 
thus highlighting how greater citizen participation in authoritarian countries is associated with 
less policy instability (or increased policy stability). 
In the following analysis, as a robustness check, I use freedom of assembly and 
association from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset as another measure of 
citizen participation. Freedom of assembly measures “the extent to which freedoms of assembly 
and association are subject to actual government limitations or restrictions.” It is scaled from 
zero to two with zero indicating restrictions on or denials of freedom of assembly and 
association, one indicating these freedoms are limited across the greater population, and two 
indicating unrestricted rights for practically all citizens. 
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5.2 HYPOTHESIS 
My hypothesis predicts that authoritarian regimes will be most successful in attracting 
FDI inflows when they have BITs and high levels of citizen participation. The bilateral 
investment treaties signal willingness by the government to attract and sustain FDI inflows, 
while high levels of citizen participation constrain the leader’s volatile decision-making, thus 
ensuring stability to the FDI friendly policies. As such, countries with few BITs or low levels of 
citizen participation will be less successful in attracting FDI as they fail to demonstrate a 
dedication to attracting FDI and/or do not have constraints ensuring the investor of policy 
stability. In both of these instances, the foreign investor is not assured that the government will 
respect his property and rights. Table 4 below provides a box with case examples of countries 
with varying degrees of BITs and citizen participation (measured by PARCOMP). The 
highlighted box refers to those countries that are expected to attract the most FDI inflows.  
Table 4 Citizen Participation and BITs in Force in Authoritarian Countries in 2008 
  BITS in FORCE 
  HIGH LOW 
PARCOMP HIGH  
Egypt (3, 69)   
Russia (4, 43)   
Jordan (4, 32)   
Singapore (2, 34)   
 
Average FDI Inflows 
Logged: 23.2 
Percent GDP: 6.9 
 
Angola (4, 3)   
Zambia (4, 2)  
Cameroon (3, 8)  
 
 
Average FDI Inflows 
Logged: 20.3 
Percent GDP: 3.1 
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LOW  
Cuba (1, 39)   
Uzbekistan (1, 42)  
Syria (1, 24)  
 
 
Average FDI Inflows 
Logged: 19.5 
Percent GDP: 1.8  
 
Myanmar (1, 2)   
North Korea (1, 9)  
 
 
 
Average FDI Inflows 
Logged: 18.6 
Percent GDP: n.a. 
** Citizen participation (scaled 1 to 4) and total BITs in force in parentheses 
Preliminary evidence of the average FDI inflows of the case examples supports my hypothesis: 
countries with BITs and high levels of citizen participation attract the most FDI inflows (23.2 
U.S. dollars logged), while countries with lower levels and fewer BITs attract less (20.3 and 19.5 
U.S. dollars logged). Countries with few BITs and low levels of citizen participation attract the 
least FDI inflows (18.6 U.S. dollars logged).  
5.3 MODEL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Following Neumayer and Spess (2005), the regression model controls for economic conditions, 
risk, and country demographics. The independent variables capturing the economic conditions of 
the host country include gross domestic product (GDP) growth and oil rents (as a percent of 
GDP) (World Bank 2011)29. Risk is measured with an economic variable and a political variable: 
inflation (consumer prices annual percent) and rule of law, respectively (World Bank 2011, 
                                                 
29 Results are robust when including mineral rents as a percent of GDP as a substitute for oil 
rents as a percent of GDP. 
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World Bank 2010)30. The total population (logged), life expectancy, and GDP per capita 
(logged) capture the country’s economic and human development and demographics (World 
Bank 2011). I also include a dummy variable that is one if the country has ever been considered 
democratic31. See Table 30 in the Appendix D for all variable descriptions. Specifically, the 
model is: 
FDIit = ß0 + ß1*BITit + ß2*PARCOMPit + ß3*BIT*PARCOMPit + ß4*Lawit + 
ß5*GDPgrowthit + ß6*Populationit + ß7*Inflationit + ß8*Oilit + ß9*Lifeit + ß10*GDPpcit + 
ß11*Democracyit 
Panel data is used to ensure that spillover effects are captured in the statistical analysis 
and to preserve sample size. The panel data is available annually from 1970 through 2008 for 87 
authoritarian countries. The sample includes only authoritarian countries32, so the data is 
unbalanced as many countries are not consistently authoritarian from 1970 to 2008. Please see 
Table 31 in Appendix D for the countries in the sample. Time dummy variables are also included 
in the regressions. 
                                                 
30 Following Neumayer and Spess (2005) inflation is not logged. However, results are robust 
upon the inclusion of inflation (logged). 
31 The democracy dummy variable is based Marshall and Gurr’s (2008) classification of 
democracy: “Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences 
about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on 
the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in 
their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall and Gurr 2008: 14). However, 
results are robust when including a democracy dummy variable based on Cheibub et al’s (2009) 
classification. 
32 Results are consistent in a full sample of all developing countries. Chandra and Rudra’s (2011) 
theory of policy stability associated with citizen participation applies to both democracies and 
nondemocracies, thus this statistically significant result in the full sample provides further 
support to this theory. See Table 19 in Appendix C. 
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I run a panel regression with country fixed effects and panel-corrected standard errors 
based on the model in Neumayer and Spess (2005). Country fixed-effects reduce omitted 
variable bias and panel-corrected standard errors address autocorrelation. The independent 
variables of interest are lagged to address endogeneity. I run two base models and a full model 
with BITs, PARCOMP, and their interaction. Then, I run the full model with freedom of 
assembly interacted with BITs. All models provide robust results for the independent variables of 
interest; see Table 5 and Figure 13 below. 
Table 5 Determinants of FDI Inflows to Authoritarian Countries: BITs and Citizen Participation 
  (Base) (Medium) (Full) (Robustness) 
          
BITs in force 0.00511 0.00674 -0.00310 0.0303*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0203) (0.0193) (0.00948) 
PARCOMP -0.108 -0.250 -0.318* 
 
 (0.152) (0.186) (0.182) 
 BITs*PARCOMP   0.0203**          0.0163*** 
               
0.0169*** 
 
 (0.00835) (0.00627) (0.00561) 
 
Free Assembly 
   
                                                             
-0.0486 
    
(0.120) 
BITs*Free Assemble 
   
                                         
0.0106* 
    
(0.00572) 
Rule of Law 0.886*** 0.0149 -0.144 -0.0664 
 
(0.113) (0.235) (0.231) (0.211) 
Log Population 0.651*** 4.274*** 2.565*** 2.018*** 
 
(0.129) (0.872) (0.729) (0.711) 
GDP Growth 
 
0.0152* 0.00434 -0.00848 
  
(0.00784) (0.00901) (0.0118) 
Life Expectancy 
 
0.106*** 0.0879*** 0.0535 
  
(0.0326) (0.0324) (0.0360) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) 
  
-0.0218** -0.0195** 
   
(0.00879) (0.00925) 
Inflation 
  
2.12e-05 1.81e-05 
   
(4.99e-05) (5.20e-05) 
Log GDP per capita 
  
0.769*** 1.115*** 
   
(0.142) (0.202) 
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Democracy Dummy 
  
9.705*** -0.475 
   
(3.093) (0.860) 
     Country Fixed 
Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 604 593 511 535 
R-squared 0.982 0.993 0.991 0.987 
Number of Countries 82 81 74 76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 13 Marginal Effect of BITs on FDI Inflows (Conditional on Citizen Participation) 
 
Figure 13 highlights how having more BITs in force is associated with greater inflows of 
FDI, given the level of citizen participation. At higher levels of PARCOMP, BITs are associated 
with greater inflows of FDI than BITs in regimes with low levels of citizen participation. To 
provide some insight into the magnitude of the effect, a ten percent increase in the number of 
BITs a country has in force is associated with an increase in FDI inflows of 0.64 points in 
countries with a transitional PARCOMP (value of 4), while the same increase results in a 0.14 
point increase in FDI inflows in countries with a repressive PARCOMP (value of 1). This is 
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significant, since within my sample of countries, FDI inflows increase by 0.11 points every year 
on average.   
Additionally, I provide a three dimensional graph of the results in Figure 24 in Appendix 
C. I graph the marginal effects of BITs and PARCOMP on FDI inflows holding all continuous 
control variables at their mean and discrete control variables at their mode. This graph highlights 
the interactive effect of BITs and PARCOMP in attracting FDI inflows to authoritarian countries. 
Under conditions of no bilateral investment treaties in force, a change in the level of citizen 
participation from one to four does not increase FDI inflows. Relatedly, when citizen 
participation is low (PARCOMP equal to one), increasing BITs from zero to twenty only causes 
a 0.57 percent increase in FDI inflows. However, when citizen participation is high (PARCOMP 
equal to four), increasing BITs from zero to twenty is associated with a 2.68 percent increase in 
FDI inflows.   
Overall, the control variables’ marginal effects are as expected. The economic and 
development variables (GDP per capita and life expectancy) are consistently positive and 
statistically significant in predicting inflows of FDI in authoritarian countries. Additionally, 
larger markets (ie, larger populations) are associated with greater FDI inflows. Surprisingly, rule 
of law is not consistently statistically significant in the full models, although it is positive and 
significant in the base models, as expected. This result may be because rule of law is collinear 
with other independent variables (like life expectancy and GDP per capita), thus not being a 
valid predictor of FDI inflows in the full models.  
Further, to test the validity of my theoretical arguments I estimate the effect of BITs and 
PARCOMP and their interaction on the level of political risk and rule of law in authoritarian 
countries. This regression analyzes if BITs and citizen participation do lower political risk and 
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increase property right security in authoritarian countries. Political risk is measured as total 
political risk according to the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services 2011).33 
Political risk is scaled from 0 to 100 with high values indicating low risk and low values 
indicating high risk. Table 13 in Appendix C provides the estimation results. As expected, 
BITs*PARCOMP interaction is positive and statistically significant in predicting both the rule of 
law and (low levels of) political risk.  
5.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I conduct several robustness checks. First, I estimate the model using alternative specifications of 
the dependent variable, sample (all developing countries, resource rich countries excluded, polity 
classification of authoritarianism, FDI inflows by sector, imputed data), and methods of 
regression analysis34. To begin, I substitute FDI as a percent of GDP for inflows of FDI in 
current US dollars (logged) as the independent variable. The results remain consistent and 
statistically significant. See Table 14 in the Appendix C for model results. Then, I run the model 
excluding resource rich countries, measured as countries with oil and gas production greater than 
one hundred dollars per capita (Ross 2012). Similarly, the BIT*PARCOMP interaction is 
                                                 
33 The Political Risk Services’ (2011) measure of political risk includes twelve components: 
Government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.  
34 I do not estimate a model using bilateral FDI flows as this data has a very limited sample size 
(Neumayer and Spess 2005). In addition, between 1970 and 2011, the average outward FDI from 
the developed economies of the U.S., Western Europe, Canada, Israel, Japan, and Australia 
reached 90 percent of total worldwide FDI outflows (UNCTAD 2011b). Thus, since the 
overwhelming majority of FDI flows since 1970 have been from the developed world the need 
for bilateral estimation is reduced. 
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positive and the conditional coefficients are statistically significant in predicting that at higher 
levels of PARCOMP, BITs are associated with greater inflows of FDI (base and medium models 
reveal a positive, statistically significant BIT*PARCOMP effect). The estimation results are in 
Table 15 and Figure 25 in Appendix C. Interestingly, the results are also robust on a sample of 
oil-rich countries only (see Table 16 in Appendix C). However, in the sample of the biggest oil 
producers (measured as the top half of authoritarian oil producers), this interaction is not 
statistically significant in predicting FDI inflows. Authoritarian leaders with extremely high 
levels of oil revenues will not be constrained by citizen input because they can use and distribute 
resource rents to thwart rebellion and maintain stability (column two in Table 16).35 
Disaggregated FDI data contains a lot of missing data and therefore few observations for 
analysis. However, I run a base model of the effect of BITs*PARCOMP on FDI inflows to the 
three principal sectors: primary (natural resources, agriculture), secondary (manufacturing), and 
tertiary (services) (Mihalache-O’Keef and Li 2011). Results are robust for secondary and tertiary 
sectors, however the interaction is not statistically significant in predicting inflows of FDI in the 
primary sector (See Table 17 in Appendix C). A possible explanation for the insignificant 
primary sector results could be related to the rise in agricultural FDI for food security purposes 
(Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). Because of the need for food production, foreign firms and 
governments will accept the most economically lucrative deal that is quickest to negotiate (as 
opposed to the most secure) when investing abroad. Deininger and Byerlee’s (2011) World Bank 
                                                 
35 In many resource-rich nations, income from natural resources is not sufficient to cover all 
government expenses or provide ample material concessions to appease the public (Chua 2003, 
Baunsgaard et al 2012, Collier et al 2010). Thus, citizen participation can and does constrain 
authoritarian leaders with resource rents.  
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report on farmland corroborates this finding that FDI in agriculture flows to countries with weak 
governance infrastructures.  
Regression results are robust for additional alternative sample sets: see Table 18 in 
Appendix C for results using polity classification of authoritarianism and Table 19 in Appendix 
C for results on the sample of all developing countries (please see footnote 32 for an explanation 
of estimation on sample of all developing countries)36. Finally, I estimate the model using a fixed 
effects regression (as opposed to a panel regression including country dummies in the main 
model). Table 20 in Appendix C reveals a positive and statistically significant effect of bilateral 
investment treaties and citizen participation on FDI inflows in the base, medium, and full 
models.  
Next, to further increase confidence, I create five imputed datasets using Amelia II 
(Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2012) and run estimations on the stacked datasets following the 
Rubin’s (1987) combination rules. I run a random-effects regression on a balanced dataset of 
authoritarian countries (all countries who have never been considered democratic) for the 
BITs*PARCOMP and BITs*Freedom of Assembly interaction base and full models37. Table 21 
in Appendix C provides the results. Although the BITs*PARCOMP interaction is not statistically 
significant, the conditional coefficients show a positive and statistically significant effect: the 
marginal effect of BITs is greatest in countries with high levels of citizen participation. The 
freedom of assembly regression results are robust.   
                                                 
36 The results are also robust upon the exclusion of China (an outlier) from the sample.  
37 Please note that I must use a balanced dataset when using the multiple imputation estimation 
commands in STATA. I chose to highlight the random effects regression results because the 
fixed effects regression results are not robust (for models with inflows of FDI in current U.S. 
dollars (logged) as the dependent variable). However, the fixed effects regression results are 
robust for models with inflows of FDI as a percent of GDP as the dependent variable. 
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Second, I further address issues of endogeneity by running a dynamic panel model, an 
instrumental variable model, and a selection model (see Simmons 2010 for endogeneity concerns 
associated with research on international treaties). The primary concern is reverse causality of 
inflows of FDI influencing the number of BITs in force and level of citizen participation. 
However, it is important to note that the possible endogeneity could be causing an 
underestimation of the true causal effect. For example, as a country received greater inflows of 
FDI it has less need to sign more bilateral investment treaties. Thus, the effect of FDI on BITs is 
negative. Similarly, the effect of FDI inflows increasing exclusionary politics is supported in the 
dependency literature (see Evans (1979), for example).   
However, in order to thoroughly address issues of endogeneity, I first use the Arellano-
Bond method to estimate the variation of FDI in authoritarian regimes38. The independent 
variables of interest, BITs and PARCOMP are considered endogenous in this estimation. In these 
models, I fail to reject no second order autocorrelation and the Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions, thus fulfilling the Arellano-Bond assumptions of no autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic errors and a weak relationship between the instruments and error term. See Table 
22 in the Appendix for estimation results, the interaction of BITs and PARCOMP is positive and 
statistically significant in the base models indicating that at high levels of citizen participation, 
BITs are associated with greater inflows of FDI39.  
                                                 
38 The Arellano-Bond estimation also addresses issues of temporal dependence by including a 
lagged dependent variable (FDI inflows) as an independent variable. 
39 In the full model estimation, BITs*PARCOMP is not statistically significant (however, the 
coefficient is in expected direction) in predicting FDI inflows to authoritarian regimes. However, 
the Arellano-Bond estimation results are robust for the full model (and base models) in the 
developing country sample.  
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I also estimate an instrumental variable model to further account for endogeneity (Table 
23 in Appendix C).  Following Rosendorff and Shin (2011), I use the number of United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conventions in force as the 
instrument for bilateral investment treaties (UNESCO 2013). Rosendorff and Shin (2011) argue 
that UNESCO conventions are a good instrument as they indicate a country’s willingness to 
participate in international law relationships, but the conventions are not related to FDI inflows 
and thus should not impact FDI flows to the signatory. To instrument for citizen participation, I 
use public health expenditures as a percent of GDP. Public health expenditures are associated 
with the welfare-enhancing policies pursued by leaders in regimes with high levels of citizen 
participation (citizen participation and public health expenditures are positively correlated in 
authoritarian countries). However, the level of public health expenditures is not highly correlated 
with inflows of FDI (correlation is close to zero). Research indicates that educational skills, not 
the level of healthcare, is a the most important aspect human capital for attracting FDI flows 
(Noorbakhsh et al 2001). Additionally, I include another instrument for citizen participation: 
women’s political rights from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset, which contains 
measures that proxy for citizen participation: the right of women to petition government officials 
and join parties. This variable also assesses women’s right to vote and hold political positions. 
Women’s political rights and citizen participation are positively correlated (0.3), while the 
correlation between women’s political rights and inflows of FDI is small (less than 0.1) in 
authoritarian countries. Blanton and Blanton (2011) is the first working paper to assess how 
women’s political and economic rights attract inflows of FDI to developing countries and they 
find mixed and contradictory results. Thus, I argue that women’s political rights is not a strong 
indicator of FDI inflows. The results of the instrumental variable regression show a robust 
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positive and statistically significant effect of BITs*PARCOMP (instrumented) on inflows of FDI 
to authoritarian countries. Unfortunately, my model does not meet the parameters for 
underidentification or strong identification as I fail to reject the Kleibergen-Paap statistic of 
having fewer true instruments than endogenous variables and I fail to reject the Kelibergen-Paap 
F statistic of weak instruments. However, I do fail to reject the Hansen J Statistic of 
overidentification. Additionally, it is important to note that the endogeneity test (equivalent to 
Hausman test statistic) shows that both bilateral investment treaties and citizen participation are 
not endogenous in the regression40.  
Then, following Rosendorff and Shin (2011), I estimate a selection model for selection 
into signing bilateral investment treaties. In the two stage least squares regression, the dependent 
variable in the first stage is a dummy variable for signing a bilateral investment treaty, while the 
second stage’s dependent variable is FDI inflows. In the first stage, the number of UNESCO 
conventions is the instrumental variable for signing a bilateral investment treaty (taken from 
Rosendorff and Shin 2011, see above). Following Rosendorff and Shin (2011), I also control for 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), government stability, GDP growth, and GDP per capita in 
the selection equation. Table 24 in Appendix C highlights the positive and statistically significant 
effect of UNESCO conventions predicting signing a BIT in the first stage and then the robust 
results of the BITs*PARCOMP interaction in predicting FDI inflows in the second stage.  
Third, I control for additional variables (time trend, international factors, corruption, 
labor rights, and conflict) in order to account for all key determinants of FDI and to address 
alternative hypotheses. In the past decades, the number of BITs signed has increased 
significantly. To account for this trend, I include a time trend variable in my analysis. Results are 
                                                 
40 Please note that this test may not be valid as the instruments are considered weak. 
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robust. Additionally, I control for international factors that could attract foreign investors to 
developing countries: capital account openness (Chin and Ito 2008) and foreign aid (World Bank 
2011). Integration in the international system and level of foreign aid are positively correlated 
with FDI inflows. My hypothesis that BITs*PARCOMP effectively predict FDI inflows remains 
robust. A final control variable of interest is conflict- as war or civil strife may deter foreign 
investment. I control for the level of internal conflict, which captures civil war, coup threats, 
terrorism, political violence, and civil disorder (Political Risk Services 2011). Conflict is not 
statistically significant in predicting FDI inflows, ceteris paribus. Table 25 in the Appendix C 
presents these results. 
In order to address the alternative hypotheses that corruption and lax labor laws attract 
foreign investors by ‘greasing the wheel’ and decreasing labor strikes and protests, respectively, 
I run my main model including control of corruption and workers rights as control variables. 
Table 25 in the Appendix C indicates robust results for the BIT*PARCOMP interaction, while 
control of corruption and workers’ rights have an insignificant effect on FDI to authoritarian 
regimes. 
Next, I test the alternative hypothesis that the strength of enforcement procedures dictated 
by the BITs in force is a key determinant of FDI inflows to authoritarian countries. Allee and 
Peinhardt’s (2010) data indicates that the strength of enforcement procedures are weaker in 
authoritarian regimes and thus could be associated with increased noncompliance by the 
authoritarian leader. I estimate the base and full models including total BITs in force multiplied 
by the average strength of enforcement procedures (scaled 0 to 3 with higher values indicating 
stronger provisions). See Table 26 in the Appendix for regression results. Although the 
 65 
interaction term is positively signed, it is not statistically significant.41 Thus, the strength of 
enforcement procedures specified in BITs does not significantly influence FDI inflows to 
authoritarian countries. A key implication of these results is that compliance to international 
treaties is determined primarily by domestic conditions within the signatory.  
Finally, I test the alternative hypothesis that formal political institutions attract foreign 
investment to authoritarian regimes. For example, Gandhi (2008) argues that institutionalization 
in authoritarian regimes leads to greater stability in policy-making, which is attractive to 
investors (144). The formal institution independent variables of interest are PARREG, which 
measures the degree of organization and institutionalization of participation, the number of 
political parties in legislature, the mode of legislature selection, and the number of veto players 
(Cheibub et al 2009, Marshall and Gurr 2008, Henisz 2000). Chart 2 in Appendix B contains all 
variable descriptives. See Table 6 and Figure 14 below for estimation results. 
Table 6 Determinants of FDI Inflows to Authoritarian Countries: Formal Political Institutions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
BITs in force 0.142*** 0.0202 -0.00664 0.123*** 0.0289*** 0.0212 
 
(0.0352) (0.0254) (0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0101) (0.0178) 
Legislature 0.552** -0.119 -0.188 
   
 
(0.241) (0.186) (0.183) 
   BITs*Legislature -0.0457*** 0.0124 0.0204* 
   
 
(0.0163) (0.0125) (0.0123) 
   PARREG 
   
0.174 
  
    
(0.218) 
  BITs*PARREG 
   
-0.0261*** 
  
    
(0.00748) 
  Veto Players 
    
-0.0123 
 
     
(0.274) 
 BITs*Veto Players 
    
0.0122 
 
     
(0.0177) 
 
                                                 
41 The conditional coefficients are not robust. 
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Parties 
     
-0.0397 
      
(0.187) 
BITs*Parties 
     
0.00811 
      
(0.00872) 
Rule of Law 0.986*** -0.0106 -0.360 -0.117 -0.398 -0.379 
 
(0.148) (0.333) (0.381) (0.209) (0.387) (0.388) 
Log Population 0.621*** 4.638*** 2.933*** 2.466*** 2.466*** 2.892*** 
 
(0.132) (0.875) (0.868) (0.679) (0.746) (0.885) 
GDP Growth 
 
0.00966 -0.00223 0.00411 6.58e-05 9.78e-06 
  
(0.00755) (0.00915) (0.00880) (0.00963) (0.00958) 
Life Expectancy 
 
0.0957** 0.0713 0.0754** 0.0718 0.0702 
  
(0.0411) (0.0445) (0.0315) (0.0446) (0.0438) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) 
  
-0.0193** -0.0214** -0.0192** -0.0180** 
   
(0.00885) (0.00890) (0.00866) (0.00909) 
Inflation 
  
1.05e-05 2.11e-05 8.03e-06 8.45e-06 
   
(5.41e-05) (5.10e-05) (5.45e-05) (5.44e-05) 
Log GDP per capita 
  
0.861*** 0.798*** 0.880*** 0.852*** 
   
(0.206) (0.134) (0.199) (0.204) 
Democracy Dummy 
  
0.997 -2.460* -4.522*** 0.949 
   
(1.209) (1.342) (1.256) (1.161) 
       Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 682 661 548 511 539 548 
R-squared 0.974 0.988 0.984 0.991 0.984 0.985 
Number of countries 88 86 76 74 74 76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 14 Marginal Effect of BITs on FDI Inflows (Conditional on Legislature) 
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Table 6 highlights that formal institutions do not attract FDI inflows to authoritarian countries 
with BITs. Veto players and political parties fail to be statistically significant in attracting FDI to 
authoritarian regimes with BITs in force42. The legislature is inconsistent in attracting FDI to 
authoritarian regimes with BITs in force. In fact, the Figure 14 above highlights how the positive 
and statistically significant result of legislature*BITs is not robust. The marginal effect of BITs 
attracting FDI to authoritarian regimes is not statistically significant in regimes with differing 
modes of selection in the legislature. Further, the PARREG*BITs interaction is negative and 
statistically significant. This result suggests that in authoritarian countries with BITs greater 
institutionalized political participation is associated with less inflows of FDI. Perhaps, foreign 
investors view the formal institutions as constraints to achieving their preferred policies (Li and 
Resnick 2003). Overall, my results reveal that foreign investors do not value formal institutions 
as a means to secure their property in authoritarian regimes.  
As an additional check, I estimate the model including both formal political institutions 
and informal citizen participation and their interaction with BITs in force. Table 27 in Appendix 
C presents the results. The first regression highlights the robustness of my variable of interest, 
the interaction of BITs and citizen participation, after the inclusion of the veto player and 
political parties covariates. In the next two regressions, BITs*PARCOMP interaction is positive 
and statistically significant, while BITs*Veto Players and BITs*Parties are not statistically 
significant.   
                                                 
42 Please note that the conditional coefficients for veto players and political parties are 
statistically significant. However, the marginal effect of BITs on FDI inflows is significantly 
smaller at the highest levels of veto players and political parties (0.041 and 0.037 respectively) 
compared to the highest level of citizen participation (0.064, see Figure 13 above). Additionally, 
research suggests that the interaction term’s statistical significance is the critical value in 
explaining model significance (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), for example). The 
marginal effects for PARREG models are not statistically significant. 
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5.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Overall, the empirical results provide strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
authoritarian countries with bilateral investment treaties and high levels of citizen participation 
attract the most foreign direct investment inflows. BITs play a critical role in signaling a will to 
pursue liberal economic policies, while citizen participation ensures stability to these FDI 
friendly policies. Countries with few BITs and/or low levels of citizen participation are not as 
successful in attracting FDI inflows. The estimation results are robust to alternative 
specifications of the dependent and independent variables, additional controls, and different 
samples and regression methods. In fact, the BITs*PARCOMP interaction remains positive and 
statistically significant in predicting FDI even after controlling for formal political institutions, 
such as the political parties in the legislature or number of veto players.  
Ultimately, this analysis builds on Chandra and Rudra (2011) to show the effectiveness of 
citizen participation in reducing erratic and opportunistic decision-making by authoritarian 
leaders on policies related to foreign direct investment. The results provide further support that 
informal citizen participation, as opposed to of formal political institutions, is the key indicator 
of constraints on authoritarian leaders.   
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6.0  CASE STUDY: JORDAN AND SYRIA 
While conducting my survey of U.S. multinational companies, a respondent called me to tell me 
that he would “never invest in authoritarian countries.” He said he wanted to emphasize to me 
the risks of investing in authoritarian countries. He further explained that his father was 
commissioned by the Syrian government to invest in the country. His father took the opportunity 
and spent much time and resources developing and starting production in Syria. However, after 
several years of production, the Syrian government expropriated the land and the respondent’s 
father’s company lost their venture and a lot of capital. Although the Syrian government itself 
called for foreign investment, the lack of constraints on the leadership ultimately led to 
tremendous losses for the multinational company.  
The FDI data highlights this risk of investing in Syria: despite Syria’s large population 
and oil reserves, it receives below average inflows of FDI for the Middle Eastern and North 
African region (Stevenson 2010). However, many of Syria’s authoritarian neighbors have been 
quite successful in attracting FDI inflows: Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia all receive above 
average inflows of FDI for the region (Stevenson 2010). This chapter presents a case study of 
Syria and Jordan to illustrate the tenants of my theory—authoritarian countries that signal FDI 
friendly policies and have high levels of citizen participation attract the most FDI inflows.  
Following Gerring (2007), I conduct a most-similar case research design to illustrate and 
analyze the foundations and causal mechanisms of my theory. The most similar system case 
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study methodology is taken from Przeworksi and Tuene’s The Logic of Comparative Social 
Inquiry (1970) and John Stuart Mill’s method of difference (Skocpol and Somers 1980). 
Przeworski and Tuene (1970) explain that in the most similar systems design, “Common 
systemic characteristics are conceived of as ‘controlled for,’ whereas intersystemic differences 
are viewed as explanatory variables” (33).  
Specifically, Jordan and Syria have similar levels of economic development (measured 
by GDP per capita and life expectancy) and both are located in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Additionally, Jordan and Syria have signed comparable numbers of bilateral 
investment treaties- 32 and 24 respectively. Both countries have thus made concerted efforts to 
signal to the international community that they wish to attract foreign investment. However, 
Jordan and Syria differ on one key aspect: citizen participation. While Jordan allows high levels 
of citizen participation (among the highest among authoritarian countries), Syria greatly 
represses citizen participation and ranks among the lowest of authoritarian countries. However, 
in regards to formal political institutions, both Syria and Jordan have elected legislatures with 
multiple parties (Cheibub et al 2009). Table 7 below summaries this data and the most similar 
design43. The outcome variable, FDI inflows, also differs between the two countries with Jordan 
leading in attracting FDI44.   
                                                 
43 Please see the empirical chapter and Appendix D for data descriptions and sources. 
44 Please note that one big difference between Jordan and Syria is that Syria contains vast oil 
resources. The value of oil and gas production per capita in Syria in 2008 was 763 dollars, 
compared to 12 dollars per capita in Jordan (Ross 2012). Ultimately, this fact further contributes 
to the strength of my argument—despite Syria’s oil, it fails to attract investment; while resource-
poor Jordan remains successful in attracting high levels of FDI. 
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Table 7 Jordan and Syria Comparison 
 PARCOMP BITs GDP 
per 
capita 
Life 
Expectancy 
Legislature Region FDI 
Inflows 
(% 
GDP) 
FDI Inflows 
(logged) 
Jordan 4 32 8.3 73 Elected, 
Multiple 
Parties 
MENA 12.45 2,800,000,000 
Syria 1 24 7.9 75 Elected, 
Multiple 
Parties 
MENA 2.79 1,500,000,000 
 
This case study analysis seeks to investigate how two countries with similarly high levels 
of BITs in force, but differing levels of citizen participation attract (or deter) FDI inflows. As 
such, this comparison fits in the first two vertical boxes of the hypothesis matrix discussed in the 
empirical chapter: 
Table 8 Citizen Participation and BITs in Force in Jordan and Syria 
  BITS in FORCE 
  HIGH LOW 
PARCOMP HIGH  
Jordan (4, 32)   
 
 
LOW  
Syria (1, 24) 
 
** Citizen participation (scaled 1 to 4) and total BITs in force in parentheses 
Ultimately, this case study will illuminate the declaration of FDI friendly policies by both the 
Jordanian and Syrian governments, while highlighting how Jordan’s government incorporated 
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and listened to the wider populous on these economic issues and Syria’s government acted with 
little societal input. Jordan has continued to advance FDI friendly policies domestically, while 
the Syrian government’s rhetoric has been largely superficial. The unconstrained behavior of the 
Syrian government has deterred FDI inflows, whereas Jordan’s embrace of civil society has 
attracted and sustained foreign investment (and liberal economic policies) in the country. In the 
end, the raw data on the key variables of interest (bilateral investment treaties, citizen 
participation, and foreign direct investment inflows) reveal a similar story.  
6.1  DECLARATION AND PUBLICATION OF FDI FRIENDLY 
POLICIES 
Both the Jordanian and Syrian governments have signed bilateral investment treaties45 and 
publically declared a desire to attract foreign direct investment. Both Jordan and Syria have 
signed bilateral investment treaties with their neighbors (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Morocco), the emerging developing economies (China, India, Indonesia, Russia), and the 
developed world (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Switzerland) (UNCTAD 2011). The 
breadth of the signatories highlights the desire of both governments to signal a commitment to 
attracting FDI to the wide international audience and a diverse group of multinational companies. 
Figure 15 below graphs the rise in BITs signed by both nations.  
                                                 
45 According to Alle and Peinhardt (2010), the (data available) BITs signed by Jordan and Syria 
specify the ICSID in their legal provisions.  
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Figure 15 BITs in Force in Jordan and Syria 
The signing of the BITs by Jordan and Syria has been publicized in the international 
media in sources such as the Baltic News Service, The Business Times Singapore, The Times 
(London), and the BBC. For example, in the Straits Times (Singapore), King Abdullah II heralds 
the signing of the investment treaty with Singapore and indicates that “The way the Singapore 
Government has been able to address reform and come from where it was many years ago to 
where it is now was really for us an example” (“Jordan King Hails FTA with S’pore” 2004). 
Thus, the international community is well informed of both governments’ international 
commitments to attracting FDI inflows.  
In addition to signing BITs, Jordan and Syria have both embraced and championed liberal 
economics in their local political rhetoric. These domestic choices highlight the outward desire 
of the regimes to embrace the liberal economic policies of the international investment treaties 
and to signal this choice to their domestic constituents. In Jordan, King Hussein chartered a path 
in support of world trade, finance, and investment in 1989 and King Abdullah II further pushed 
for liberalization reforms during his first years as leader in the early 2000s by calling for an 
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improved investment environment and greater openness to the world (Milton-Edwards and 
Hinchcliffe 2009: 78, 89). For instance, Stevenson (2010) elucidates King Abdullah II’s 
commitment to liberal economics:  
Since 1999 and the coming to the throne of King Abdullah, developing the country’s 
domestic economic potential and improving its living standards have become the main 
policy priorities. The aim of the government is full implementation of a market economy 
and full integration in the world market… Acknowledgement of the role of the private 
sector as a main partner in economic activity was confirmed in the government’s 
National Social and Economic Development Plan 2004-2006 (225).   
 
The National Social and Economic Development Plan, also known as the National Agenda, 
presented Jordan’s goals and strategies in regards to economic development and reconstruction. 
Primary targets included increasing GDP growth, per capita income, employment, women’s 
employment, and foreign direct investment inflows and decreasing debt and poverty (Stevenson 
2010: 225). The National Agenda was conceived in three phases involving promoting labor-
intensive industry, investing in infrastructure and governance, and liberalizing markets 
(Stevenson 2010: 225).  
Similarly, the Syrian government began implementing liberalizing policies after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (its major trading partner). Beginning in the late 1980s, Hafez al-
Assad started to advance economic liberalization, including liberal investment policies (Haddad 
2012, Stevenson 2010). For example, in 1991, the Investment Law No. 10 was enacted, which 
intended to attract inward investments (Haddad 2012: 125-126). Also, the regime offered 
incentives to foreign manufacturing companies in order to further privatization efforts in that 
sector (Stevenson 2010: 278). Then, Bashar al-Assad called for further liberalization and 
economic progress in the beginning of his tenure (Haddad 2012, George 2003). In his inaugural 
address, Bashar al-Assad called for  
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Steady, yet gradual, steps towards introducing economic changes through modernizing 
laws, removing bureaucratic obstacles to the flow of domestic and foreign investments, 
mobilizing public and private capital and activating the private sector and giving it better 
business opportunities (George 2003: 160).  
 
Thus, the Syrian government has also publically declared a desire to advance liberal economic 
policies throughout the last two decades. However, the actual implementation of these liberal 
economic policies since the end of the Cold War has been minimal46 (Wacziarg and Welch 2008, 
Hinnebusch 2012, Haddad 2012). For example, the Investment Law No. 10 is considered a 
“loner” law as no additional reforms complemented this initial law (Haddad 2012: 132). As a 
result, obstacles to investment, such as regulations, remained high within Syria (Haddad 2012). 
 Ultimately, both the Jordanian and Syrian governments signaled to the international 
community their dedications to attracting FDI inflows through signing bilateral investment 
treaties. These signals were representative of a desire by the regimes to pursuing liberal 
economic policies (as is seen in the domestic policies and/or official speeches in both countries). 
6.2 DIFFERENCES IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
Although Jordan and Syria have chartered similar paths in regards to publically embracing 
liberalization and foreign investment, they differ drastically in their domestic institutional 
environments supporting these policies. Jordan experiences high levels of citizen participation 
and civic activism (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009), whereas Syria remains very 
                                                 
46 Haddad (2011) describes the limited economic reform advocated and implemented by Bashar 
al-Assad. He announced a plan for a “Social Market Economy” in 2005 that would involve 
significant economic reform—the Syrian Investment Agency was created and new investment 
law were passed shortly after (Haddad 2011). However, overall, Syria remains closed, heavily 
regulated, and dominated by crony capitalism (Haddad 2011, Donati 2012).  
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repressive of participatory politics and is described as a “police state” by many scholars (Milton-
Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009, George 2003). The data on citizen participation (measured by 
PARCOMP scaled from one to five) highlights this difference:  
 
 
Figure 16 Citizen Participation in Jordan and Syria 
Figure 16 indicates that Syria has remained at the lowest level of citizen participation 
(PARCOMP value of one) during the past forty years while Jordan’s level of citizen participation 
increased in the early 1990s and is now relatively high (PARCOMP value of four).  
In 1989, Jordan embarked on a path of political liberalization that involved a significant 
increase in popular participation and the freedom of assembly (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 
2009, Ryan 2010)47. Although this political liberalization involved the formation and 
strengthening of formal institutions and processes (ie, elections), these formal institutions in 
                                                 
47 Please note that despite the relatively high levels of citizen participation and freedom of 
assembly in Jordan compared to other authoritarian countries, there still exists limits on 
participation and associational activity (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009, Wiktorowicz 
2000, Ryan 2010).  
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Jordan do not aptly capture constraints on the King. In fact, Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 
(1999) clarify that,  
Since 1989, it (the parliament) has become a more credible, representative, and 
influential institution. Still, serious constitutional, political, and internal hurdles continue 
to prevent it from enjoying the prerogatives and from performing a range of functions 
that are appropriate for a legislature in a democratic system (164-5).  
 
The parliament is characterized by limited representation and low voter turnout and the public 
has little confidence in its capacities (Baaklini et al 1999).  
Instead, this case study focuses on the flourishing of informal citizen participation in 
decision-making in Jordan in 1989 and its further strengthening over time. For instance, Ryan 
(2010) explains,  
Civil society has nonetheless continued to emerge in Jordan, especially in the wake of the 
political and economic liberalization process…. Beyond the numerous legal parties and 
professional associations within the kingdom, the key facets of Jordan’s still-emerging 
civil society (as opposed to more explicitly political society) include many 
nongovernmental organizations within the kingdom (330). 
 
Examples of Jordan’s economic civil society organizations include the Amman Chamber of 
Commerce, Amman Chamber of Industry, Jordan Business Association (JBA), and the Jordan-
U.S. Business Partnership (Carroll 2003).48 In particular, the JBA has been an influential player 
in economic policymaking with the government since its founding in 1985 (Knowles 2005: 
74)49. The JBA communicates with both the government and foreign investors in order to 
promote and maintain a favorable business environment for private enterprises (Knowles 2005: 
                                                 
48 In addition, the semi-state institutions of the Jordan Investment Corporation and Jordan 
Investment Promotion Office were established to attract private investment (Knowles 2005: 52). 
Furthermore, professional and employer organizations and nongovernmental organizations are 
active throughout Jordan (for example, see http://www.civilsociety-jo.net/en/ and Ryan 2010) 
49 Carroll (2003) describes the Amman Chamber of Commerce and Amman Chamber of Industry 
as “state-dictated channels that served more to provide the state with legitimation and 
information than to give the business community a voice” (152). Instead, the JBA was the most 
influential and sovereign organization in the business sector.  
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74-75, Carroll 2003: 151). Carroll (2003) explains the process of the JBA in public deliberation 
and policymaking,  
The JBA held monthly meetings with key decision-makers (these were open to members 
and non-members); developed standing committees to address issues related to bilateral 
agreements and economic laws; and invited and hosted foreign delegations and individual 
potential investors (153).  
 
The JBA also “negotiated directly with the executive branch of the government” (Carroll 2003: 
151). Importantly, the policies advocated by the business community were productive, not rent-
seeking in nature—they involved requesting greater participatory decision-making, bureaucratic 
reform, and sectoral assistance with competitiveness (Carroll 2003)50. Also, importantly, foreign 
investors and attracting foreign investment are priorities within the business community as 
highlighted in Carroll’s (2003) description of the JBA’s policymaking processes and in the 
establishment and success of foreign-local based organizations like the Jordan-U.S. Business 
Partnership.  
There exists ample evidence that the Jordanian government actively involved and listened 
to the wider populous and these business interest groups when devising and establishing 
economic policies. First, scholars have cited primary evidence of government officials 
advocating inclusionary decision-making. For example, Carroll’s (2003) interview research 
reveals,  
                                                 
50 Moore (2000) discusses the weaknesses and unproductive activities of the business sector in 
Jordan. However, his analysis focuses on formal relationships between business and the 
parliament, such as lobbying and representation (Moore 2000: 188).  In contrast to Moore, 
Carroll (2003) explains, “State and business have negotiated out their new relationship largely 
outside of Jordan’s newly-active democratic institutions” (4). In this environment, business 
associations and other economic organizations have been strong and growing. In addition, 
Carroll’s (2003) analysis of the productive policies of business associations follows the research 
by Doner and Schneider (2000) on the market supporting and complementing activities of 
business associations in the developing world. See footnote 20 for further details. 
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State officials repeatedly stressed the need for business to reach a consensus within the 
community and to then bring that consensus to the state… officials believe that is 
businesspeople bring a common policy position to the state, then that policy is likely to… 
promote the good of the economy as a whole (164).  
 
In particular, the Jordanian Director of Securities Exchange explained that the government needs 
input from the private sector in order to advance policies that are employment, growth, and 
welfare enhancing (Carroll 2003: 158).  
Second, the National Agenda, involving key economic issues such as GDP growth, 
employment, FDI inflows, poverty, and debt was “developed in consultation with stakeholders 
from different sectors, civil society associations, and the public” (Stevenson 2010: 225). This 
National Agenda process amply highlights the participatory, inclusionary decision-making 
regarding economic affairs in Jordan (Stevenson 2010, Ryan 2010). The former foreign minister, 
Marwan Muasher, led the “broad-based” committee of both government and societal participants 
in drafting the National Agenda that ultimately advocated further strengthening of civil society 
(Ryan 2010: 332). This National Agenda represented a continuation of the liberal economic 
policies pursued throughout the 1990s and 2000s, thus highlighting the incremental nature of 
policymaking associated with governments with high levels of citizen participation. Also, the 
cornerstone of the National Agenda was liberal economic policies, underscoring the preferences 
of the citizens for such economic strategies.   
In contrast to Jordan, Syria allows little civil society freedoms and has continued to 
repress civic activism in the past ten years (Stevenson 2010, George 2003, Carapico 2010, 
Lawson 2010). George (2003) explains that the Syrian government monitors and controls 
associational activity: Associations “are allowed to function in peace only to the extent that they 
do not impinge on the prerogatives of the regime- which in this police state leaves them with 
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only smallest room for maneuver” (x). In fact, during the Damascus Winter51 in 2001, the Syrian 
regime imposed new and greater restrictions on the freedom of speech and assembly (Lawson 
2010: 418). 
Although business associations and networks exist in Syria, such as the Syrian Business 
Council, Chamber of Commerce, Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre and the Syria Young 
Entrepreneurs Association (Haddad 2012, Stevenson 2010), the environment is characterized as 
rife with crony capitalism (Donati 2012, Haddad 2012). Donati (2012) explains that in Syria, 
“liberalization and privatization … work as instruments for co-opting and reorganizing networks 
of allegiance” (49). In particular, economic opportunities are distributed to businessmen close to 
the regime (George 2003: 160). As such, Haddad (2012) explains that the “Chambers are not 
(yet) taken seriously as representative institutions by prominent members of the business 
community” (108). The prevalence of patronage ties and mistrust between the government and 
economic community has hampered strong, productive relationships (Haddad 2012).  
Ultimately, the Syrian leadership is unconstrained- the public and autonomous 
organizations play little to no role in decision-making (Haddad 2012: 18). Haddad (2012) 
elucidates the role of the Syrian government as a controller of the associations (as opposed to a 
facilitator of dialogue and communication):  
The function of these institutions … was not to aggregate the interests and demands of 
the business community for the purpose of formulating positive-sum policies that might 
benefit both business actors and the economy as a whole. Instead, their function was to 
circumscribe decision-making by limiting it to a small set of actors, not in accordance 
with what serves the economy, but rather in accordance with what serves whom… these 
are essentially top-down institutions that are governed primarily by regime, not by 
business rules (109).  
                                                 
51 The ‘Damascus Spring’ refers to a period of time in Syria (after Hafiz al-Assad’s death in the 
spring of 2000) when civil society and public debate flourished. This movement was quickly 
repressed in the following ‘Damascus Winter’ in 2001. (George 2003) 
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For example, within Chambers of Industry and Commerce in Syria, many of the board members 
are selected by the regime (Haddad 2012). In contrast to Jordan’s National Agenda, the civil 
society organizations involved in Syria’s Tenth Five Year Plan (2005-2010) (a framework for 
economic development and liberalization for Syria) were “closely linked to the regime” and 
ultimately “block(ed) the emergence of an autonomous civil society” (Donati 2012: 44). The 
emergence and involvement of government-connected organizations in economic policy was 
accompanied by strong repression of independent organizations (Donati 2012). In Syria, 
associational freedom is curtailed and associational independence limited. As indicated in the 
phone conversation with the survey respondent, this unconstrained executive branch is a strong 
deterrent for foreign investors investing in Syria.  
6.3 FDI INFLOWS TO JORDAN AND SYRIA 
Overall, the qualitative and quantitative evidence on Jordan and Syria indicate that Jordan will be 
most successful in attracting FDI inflows. In Jordan, the government publically signaled a 
dedication to attracting foreign investment and pursued participatory decision-making practices 
on economic policies. The inclusion of civil society and societal preferences in the economic 
policymaking ensured the stability of economically liberal policies over the past decades. In 
contrast, although the Syrian regime signaled a desire to attract FDI, the lack of constraints on 
the leadership is expected to result in a failure to attract high levels of foreign direct investment.  
Figure 17 depicts inflows of FDI to both Jordan and Syria since 1980. 
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Figure 17 FDI Inflows to Jordan and Syria 
As predicted, inflows of FDI to Jordan has increased tremendously since the government 
committed to liberal economics and allowed greater citizen participation (starting in 1989). On 
the other hand, Syria has been less successful in attracting FDI inflows. Most recently, in 2008, 
Jordan attracted nearly double the value of FDI inflows as Syria.  
To further illustrate and synthesize the tenants my theory, Figures 18 and 19 below 
document the number of BITs in force, the level of citizen participation, and inflows of FDI in 
Jordan and Syria. As discussed, Jordan’s FDI inflows begin to show a strong upward trend after 
it begins signing bilateral investment treaties and experiences an increase in citizen participation 
in the early 1990s. Despite the number of BITs in force, inflows to FDI to Syria remain fairly 
stagnant as citizen participation lags. 
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Figure 18 Determinants of FDI Inflows to Jordan 
 
 
Figure 19 Determinants of FDI Inflows to Syria 
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The data powerfully demonstrates the necessity of BITs and citizen participation in attracting 
FDI to authoritarian countries. Without domestic constraints on the authoritarian leader (as in 
Syria), bilateral investment treaties will be insufficient to attract the most FDI inflows to that 
country.  
6.4 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The survey respondent’s story about his father’s company in Syria aptly highlights the theory 
that authoritarian regimes that are constrained from above and below attract the most foreign 
direct investment inflows. Although the Syrian government continues to espouse FDI friendly 
policies, for example commissioning the respondent’s father’s company and signing bilateral 
investment treaties with countries across the globe, the lack of constraints on the leadership 
results in risk of noncompliance to these policies for the foreign investor. As the respondent’s 
story revealed, expropriation and other violations of established liberal economic policies and 
institutions occur in authoritarian countries with exclusionary, repressive policymaking52. As a 
result, Syria has been unsuccessful in attracting FDI inflows. In contrast, Syria’s neighbor, 
Jordan, has proved to be a strong destination for foreign direct investment. In Jordan, 
participatory politics have ensured a continued dedication to the government’s declared 
commitment to FDI friendly policies.  
Overall, the case study of Jordan and Syria underscore which authoritarian countries are 
most integrated in the global economy. This insight is important as participation in the 
                                                 
52 Li (2009a) does record an expropriation by the Syrian government between 1970 and 1990. 
Jordan does not have available data.  
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international economic system has strong implications for global peace, prosperity, and 
cooperation. Further, analyzing and understanding citizen preferences, expectations, and 
experiences with FDI in authoritarian regimes paints a clearer picture on the direction of 
globalization in the future. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
Although scholars have determined that democracies are attractive destinations for FDI, many 
authoritarian developing countries are drawing greater inflows of FDI in the last decades. In fact, 
some authoritarian developing countries are attracting similar levels of FDI as democratic 
developing countries. This dissertation explains which authoritarian regimes have been 
successful in attracting these FDI inflows. Specifically, the role and interplay of domestic and 
international institutions in determining investment flows to authoritarian countries is examined. 
I argue that international investment treaties are necessary to attract FDI to authoritarian regimes 
because they signal a dedication to FDI friendly policies to the investor. However, an 
authoritarian regime’s openness to citizen input plays a key role in ensuring compliance to the 
international agreement’s terms. Under conditions of citizen participation, citizens can voice 
their preferences for FDI and strong property right protections; while, leaders in these regimes 
have an incentive to listen to citizens preferences as they maintain power through welfare-
enhancing, participatory policymaking. Thus, authoritarian regimes with international investment 
treaties and high levels of citizen participation will attract the most FDI.  
Estimation results confirm both the theoretical foundations and formal hypothesis of this 
dissertation: citizens in authoritarian countries view FDI inflows as welfare-enhancing and 
authoritarian countries with bilateral investment treaties and high levels of citizen participation 
attract the most FDI inflows. Additionally, results from an original survey of U.S. foreign 
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investors reveal that multinational companies are aware of and value international investment 
treaties and freedom of association in host nations, thereby providing key primary evidence in 
support of the hypothesis. Finally, a comparative case study of Jordan and Syria further 
illustrates the micro-foundations of the theory. While both Jordan and Syria have signaled a 
dedication to liberal economic policies, Jordan has been the successor in attracting FDI inflows 
because of its participatory decision-making processes. 
7.1 CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
In this dissertation, I question several predominant assumptions found in both the political 
science literature and colloquial channels. Below I list the key points discovered and verified in 
this analysis that challenge conventional wisdom. 
• All authoritarian countries are not necessarily high-risk environments for investors 
Classical political science research and current conventional wisdom amasses all authoritarian 
countries into one general category with little detail on the variation among different regimes in 
regards to political, economic, or social conditions (ie, Friedrich and Brzeinski 1961). Recently, 
the study and classification of authoritarian institutions is a hot topic in political science 
(Levitsky and Way 2002, Magaloni 2008, Gandhi 2008, Geddes 2003, Fang and Owen 2011, 
Rosendorff and Shin 2011). This dissertation contributes to this set of literature by uncovering 
how variation in domestic institutions and participation in international agreements of 
authoritarian countries influences FDI inflows to those nations. Although, overall, authoritarian 
countries have higher levels of political risk than democratic developing countries, some 
authoritarian countries have been able to reduce this risk and attract FDI inflows.    
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• Some authoritarian leaders do listen to their citizens, especially on economic issues 
In contrast to conventional wisdom, this analysis builds on Chandra and Rudra (2011) to 
highlight how some authoritarian leaders do listen to their citizenry, especially in regards to 
economic issues (which are less contentious than political demands). Instead of formal political 
institutions (emphasized in the political science literature), which can be illegitimate and not 
binding, citizen participation better captures the ability of citizens to organize and influence the 
government. In regimes with high levels of citizen participation, societal feedback provides a 
check on executive power as the authoritarian leader appeases citizens’ interests in order to 
maintain power through legitimacy. 
• Citizens in the developing world want inflows of FDI 
Western media outlets emphasize the harsh conditions and grueling hours of multinational 
companies operating in the developing world. As a result, it is common for citizens in the 
developed world to associate FDI with protesting and condemnation by citizens in the 
developing world. However, the survey evidence and theoretical foundations presented in this 
dissertation highlight how citizens in authoritarian countries do want greater inflows of FDI as 
they associate it with increased growth, employment, and opportunity.  
7.2 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation provides several avenues for future research. Each direction for future research 
would further illuminate and clarify the major points of significance of this study. First, this 
analysis builds on Chandra and Rudra (2011) to highlight the role of citizen participation in 
attracting FDI to authoritarian regimes. Citizen participation is measured by Marshall and Gurr’s 
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(2008) PARCOMP and CIRI’s (2008) freedom of assembly. Although strong, both variables 
largely capture citizen participation in regards to political issues, while the theory focuses on 
citizen participation on economic issues. Currently, no data measures freedom of association in 
regards to economic issues and policies. The construction of such a measure would be significant 
in further understanding and analyzing freedom of association and citizen participation in 
authoritarian countries.  For instance, authoritarian governments that rely on pursuing welfare-
enhancing policies to maintain legitimacy that have low ranks on citizen participation on 
political policies might have relatively higher freedoms associated with economic matters (China 
and Vietnam would be examples) or vice versa. Uncovering this nuanced variation would be 
very insightful in terms of classifying, understanding, and measuring authoritarianism.  
Second, this dissertation analyzes the conditions under which authoritarian leaders 
comply with international investment treaties, which previous international political economy 
research has failed to address. The role of citizen participation in procuring stability to the FDI 
policies established in BITs is the key to understanding the ultimate effectiveness of BITs in 
attracting FDI inflows. This mechanism could be applied to other types of international treaties 
signed by authoritarian governments. Citizen participation could provide a clear lens to 
understanding and analyzing compliance to human rights treaties, which is a major debate in the 
literature. An application to preferential trade agreements would also be fruitful. 
The final avenue for future research is continuing and expanding the survey of managers 
in multinational companies who invest in authoritarian countries. Primary evidence on business 
preferences for FDI is integral to developing clear and accurate theories on the determinants of 
FDI to authoritarian countries. The current survey is limited due to the number of respondents 
and sample of U.S. companies only.  
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Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to inspire future research that further disaggregates and 
clarifies the domestic and international political factors that both attract and deter FDI inflows to 
authoritarian countries. Additional empirical measures on authoritarian institutions and survey 
work on preferences for FDI would contribute greatly to this agenda. Applying the theory and 
mechanisms discussed here to other fields of international political economy would also further 
illuminate the validity, breadth, and rigor of the key concepts under analysis. This future research 
would greatly contribute to the already burgeoning subject of authoritarianism in political 
science. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure 20 Average FDI Inflows (Percent of GDP) to Democratic and Authoritarian Countries 
 
 92 
 
Figure 21 Rule of Law in Democratic and Authoritarian Countries53 
 
                                                 
53 Rule of Law data is from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (2010). Rule of law 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 9 Effect of Inflows of FDI (US Dollars Logged) on Government Confidence 
 
Base Model  
Government Confidence 
Full Model 
Government Confidence 
   
Objective Measure 0.023 0.173*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
Individual Level Indicators   
Male -0.028** -0.037** 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Education -0.059*** -0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Income  -0.052*** 
  (0.004) 
Country Level Indicators   
Inflows of FDI  
(US Dollars logged) 0.046*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
GDP Growth  0.090*** 
  (0.003) 
Life Expectancy  -0.018*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Observations Level 1 24472 21543 
Observations Level 2 16 16 
Random Variance Level 1  0.157  0.241  
Model Deviance AIC  60847.79    53112.18  
Model Deviance BIC 60912.63  53199.94 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 Effect of FDI Inflows on Government Confidence: No Objective Measure 
 
Base Model  
Government Confidence 
Full Model 
Government Confidence 
   
Individual Level Indicators   
Male -0.027* -0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Education -0.061*** -0.048*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Income  -0.041*** 
  (0.004) 
Country Level Indicators   
Inflows of FDI 0.165*** 0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
GDP Growth  0.043*** 
  (0.003) 
Life Expectancy  -0.030*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Observations Level 1 24472 21543 
Observations Level 2 16 16 
Random Variance Level 1  0.266 0.195  
Model Deviance AIC  60959.75    53034.16  
Model Deviance BIC 61016.49  53113.93 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 11 Effect of Inflows of FDI on Government Confidence: Polity Classification  
 
Base Model  
Government Confidence 
Full Model 
Government Confidence 
   
Objective Measure 0.275*** 0.336*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
Individual Level Indicators   
Male -0.034** -0.026* 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Education -0.042*** -0.041*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Income  -0.011*** 
  (0.004) 
Country Level Indicators   
Inflows of FDI 0.141*** 0.086*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
GDP Growth  0.030*** 
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  (0.003) 
Life Expectancy  -0.004*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Observations Level 1 23286 20766 
Observations Level 2 16 16 
Random Variance Level 1  0.254  0.140  
Model Deviance AIC  58091.75    51445.15  
Model Deviance BIC 58156.19  51532.5 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Figure 22 Citizen Participation in Authoritarian Countries between 1990 and 2008 
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Figure 23 Legislatures in Authoritarian Countries between 1990 and 2008 
 
Table 12 Authoritarian Institutions Comparison in 2008 
Country Regime Legislature Parcomp FDI inflows 
(logged) 
Tanzania  Elected 2 19.81 
Mozambique  Elected 4 20.20 
Democratic 
Republic Congo 
 Elected 4 21.27 
North Korea Civilian  1 17.60 
Cambodia Civilian  4 20.52 
Syria Military  1 21.11 
Egypt Military  3 22.97 
Morocco Royal  2 21.63 
Jordan Royal  4 21.76 
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Figure 24 Determinants of FDI Inflows: 3D Graph 
 
 
Table 13 Determinants of Rule of Law and Political Risk in Authoritarian Countries 
  Rule of Law Political Risk 
      
BITs -0.00627** -0.188*** 
 
(0.00283) (0.0468) 
PARCOMP 0.0202 -0.116 
 
(0.0257) (0.346) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.00190* 0.0547*** 
 
(0.00101) (0.0190) 
GDP Growth 0.000205 0.178*** 
 
(0.00114) (0.0306) 
Life Expectancy 0.0344*** 0.641*** 
 
(0.00435) (0.0698) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.0943*** 2.721*** 
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(0.0303) (0.699) 
   Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 630 1,217 
R-squared 0.147 0.506 
Number of Countries 81 81 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 14 Determinants of FDI Inflows (% GDP) in Authoritarian Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
BITs in force -0.0375 -0.0566 -0.00766 
 (0.0479) (0.0456) (0.0707) 
PARCOMP -0.110 -0.333 -0.375 
 (0.858) (0.850) (1.024) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0459*** 0.0510*** 0.0634** 
 (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0248) 
Rule of Law 1.891 2.043 0.579 
 
(1.279) (1.331) (1.416) 
Log Population 3.567 3.662 12.38** 
 
(3.057) (3.819) (6.149) 
GDP Growth  -0.0925 -0.0326 
 
 (0.0570) (0.0734) 
Life Expectancy  0.147 0.379** 
 
 (0.119) (0.153) 
Oil Rent (% GDP)   -0.231** 
 
  (0.107) 
Inflation   0.000549 
 
  (0.0109) 
Log GDP per capita   -4.104*** 
 
  (1.445) 
Democracy Dummy   -21.10 
 
  (16.87) 
 
   
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 632 626 626 
R-squared 0.637 0.644 0.646 
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Number of Countries 81 81 81 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 15 Determinants of FDI Inflows to Non Resource Rich Authoritarian Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
BITs in force 0.0245 -0.00604 0.0114 
 (0.0204) (0.0249) (0.0227) 
PARCOMP 0.0705 -0.118 -0.199 
 (0.114) (0.177) (0.172) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0228*** 0.0235*** 0.00903 
 (0.00496) (0.00800) (0.00682) 
Rule of Law 1.263*** 0.0750 0.0950 
 
(0.115) (0.260) (0.272) 
Log Population 0.495*** 6.424*** 5.371*** 
 
(0.0910) (1.412) (1.292) 
GDP Growth  0.0205* 0.00655 
 
 (0.0123) (0.0155) 
Life Expectancy  0.0559 0.00354 
 
 (0.0458) (0.0459) 
Oil Rent (% GDP)   0.0809 
 
  (0.105) 
Inflation   2.77e-05 
 
  (4.94e-05) 
Log GDP per capita   0.993*** 
 
  (0.207) 
Democracy Dummy   9.466*** 
 
  (3.383) 
 
   
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 365 357 313 
R-squared 0.984 0.994 0.993 
Number of Countries 54 53 49 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 25 Marginal Effects of BITs on FDI Inflows to Non Resource Rich Authoritarian Countries 
(Full Model) 
 
Table 16 Inflows of FDI to Resource Rich Authoritarian Countries 
 
(All Oil Producers) (Top 50% of Oil Producers) 
     
BITs in force -0.00152 -0.0154 
 (0.0270) (0.0454) PARCOMP -0.450* 0.373 
 (0.261) (0.450) BITs*PARCOMP 0.0202** 0.0262 
 
(0.00875) (0.0166) 
Rule of Law 0.433 -0.492 
 
(0.440) (0.700) 
Log Population 1.412 0.972 
 
(1.022) (0.632) 
GDP Growth 0.0114 0.0298 
 
(0.00901) (0.0199) 
Life Expectancy 0.100 -0.0523 
 
(0.135) (0.220) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) -0.00450 0.0356** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0148) 
Inflation 0.00182 0.0300 
 
(0.00267) (0.0230) 
Log GDP per capita 0.525*** 0.830*** 
 
(0.148) (0.304) 
Democracy Dummy 5.612 4.229 
 
(4.315) (2.917) 
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Observations 198 109 
R-squared 0.993 0.987 
Number of Countries 34 17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 17 Determinants of FDI Inflows by Sector 
  (Primary Sector FDI) (Secondary Sector FDI) (Tertiary Sector FDI) 
        
BITs in force -1.293 -0.475* -2.060** 
 (0.919) (0.253) (0.918) 
PARCOMP -1.441 1.260 -2.296 
 (3.682) (0.948) (2.125) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.460 0.195* 0.725* 
 (0.368) (0.0987) (0.362) 
Rule of Law 6.502 -1.340 -26.47*** 
 (4.696) (1.236) (5.902) 
Log Population -28.34 6.677 18.90 
 (29.56) (7.604) (24.83) 
    
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37 37 46 
R-squared 0.280 0.552 0.536 
Number of Countries 18 20 18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 18 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Polity Classification 
  (Base) (Full) 
      
BITs in force 0.00993 0.0140 
 (0.0281) (0.0202) 
PARCOMP -0.257* -0.342*** 
 (0.143) (0.108) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0226** 0.0125* 
 (0.0107) (0.00652) 
Rule of Law 0.688*** 0.0256 
 
(0.104) (0.158) 
Log Population 0.619*** 2.305*** 
 
(0.107) (0.758) 
GDP Growth  -0.000890 
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 (0.00920) 
Life Expectancy  0.0670 
 
 (0.0457) 
Oil Rent (% GDP)  -0.0181** 
 
 (0.00886) 
Inflation  2.57e-05 
 
 (4.87e-05) 
Log GDP per capita  0.719*** 
 
 (0.154) 
Democracy Dummy  9.014* 
 
 (4.858) 
 
 
 Country Fixed Effects            No           Yes 
Decade Dummies            Yes            Yes 
Observations 615 524 
R-squared 0.983 0.992 
Number of Countries 86 77 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 19 Determinants of FDI Inflows: All Developing Countries 
    
BITs in force 0.0116 
 (0.0128) 
PARCOMP -0.192** 
 (0.0866) 
BITs*PARCOMP                            0.00495* 
 (0.00299) 
Rule of Law 0.264** 
 (0.131) 
Log Population 2.329*** 
 (0.574) 
GDP Growth 0.000698 
 (0.00719) 
Life Expectancy 0.0615** 
 (0.0258) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) -0.0285*** 
 (0.00931) 
Inflation 3.35e-05 
 (4.75e-05) 
Log GDP per capita 1.072*** 
 (0.111) 
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Democracy Dummy 8.802** 
 (3.596) 
  
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes 
Observations 1074 
R-squared 0.992 
Number of Countries 122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 20 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Fixed Effects Regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
       
BITs in force 0.0289* 0.0168 -0.00705 
 
(0.0163) (0.0211) (0.0243) 
PARCOMP -0.00512 -0.0961 -0.131 
 
(0.159) (0.189) (0.180) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0105* 0.0125** 0.0112* 
 
(0.00628) (0.00630) (0.00664) 
Rule of Law 0.530** 0.344 0.433 
 
(0.262) (0.434) (0.458) 
Log Population 4.312*** 4.002*** 0.797 
 
(0.549) (0.938) (1.018) 
GDP Growth  0.0185* 0.00421 
 
 (0.00992) (0.0182) 
Life Expectancy  0.0738 0.0218 
 
 (0.0510) (0.0608) 
Oil Rent (% GDP)   -0.00313 
 
  (0.0144) 
Inflation   -2.00e-05 
 
  (2.21e-05) 
Log GDP per capita   0.115 
 
  (0.518) 
Workers’ Rights   0.241 
   (0.161) 
Corruption   0.0985 
   (0.216) 
 
   
Year Effects No No Yes 
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Observations 604 593 499 
R-squared (within) 0.293 0.303 0.373 
Number of Countries 82 81 74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 21 Determinants of FDI: Imputed Data  
          
BITs in force 0.0493*** 0.0505*** 0.0467*** 0.0479*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00552) (0.00548) PARCOMP 0.184*** 0.166*** 
   (0.0606) (0.0597)   BITs*PARCOMP 0.000159 0.000124 
   (0.00526) (0.00526)   Free Assembly 
  
0.153** 0.135* 
   
(0.0782) (0.0806) 
BITs*Free Assemble 
  
0.0176* 0.0173* 
   
(0.00901) (0.00897) 
Rule of Law 0.0385 0.0999 0.0583 0.121 
 
(0.201) (0.208) (0.204) (0.212) 
Log Population 1.388*** 1.415*** 1.451*** 1.449*** 
 
(0.0937) (0.0993) (0.0888) (0.0955) 
GDP Growth 0.0341*** 0.0299*** 0.0344*** 0.0302*** 
 
(0.00651) (0.00675) (0.00649) (0.00676) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) 
 
0.0153*** 
 
0.0155*** 
  
(0.00518) 
 
(0.00524) 
Inflation 
 
5.20e-06 
 
1.56e-05 
  
(9.55e-05) 
 
(9.60e-05) 
Log GDP per capita 0.665*** 0.585*** 0.662*** 0.582*** 
 
(0.0741) (0.0873) (0.0746) (0.0883) 
Corruption  0.444*** 0.459*** 0.450*** 0.467*** 
 
(0.0986) (0.0988) (0.0978) (0.0983) 
     Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 
Number of Countries 57 57 57 57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 22 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Arellano Bond Estimation 
 
Log of Inflows of 
FDI 
Log of Inflows of 
FDI 
Log of Inflows of 
FDI 
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Inflows of FDI (Lagged) 0.416*** 0.351*** 0.310*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0339) (0.0508) 
BITs in force 0.0138 0.0124 -0.0432 
 (0.0205) (0.0177) (0.0385) 
PARCOMP 0.108 -0.0243 -0.0602 
 (0.260) (0.209) (0.285) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0144** 0.00871* 0.0150 
 (0.00667) (0.00452) (0.00953) 
Rule of Law 0.634*** 0.286** 0.289 
 (0.191) (0.117) (0.330) 
Log Population 2.234*** 0.744 -0.464 
 (0.430) (0.792) (1.181) 
GDP Growth  0.0129*** 0.00984* 
  (0.00491) (0.00545) 
Life Expectancy  0.282*** 0.181* 
  (0.0544) (0.104) 
Oil Rent (% GDP)   -0.0269** 
   (0.0120) 
Inflation   2.31e-05*** 
   (6.40e-06) 
Log GDP per capita   0.939*** 
   (0.184) 
    
Observations 316 315 279 
Number of countries 69 68 61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 23 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Instrumental Variable Regression  
  Log of Inflows of FDI 
    
BITs in forceX -0.140* 
 
(0.0773) 
PARCOMPXX -0.293 
 
(0.304) 
BITs*PARCOMPXXX 0.0521** 
 
(0.0251) 
Rule of Law 1.585*** 
 
(0.245) 
Log Population 0.989*** 
 
(0.226) 
GDP Growth 0.105*** 
 
(0.0273) 
Democracy Dummy -0.393 
 
(0.447) 
  Observations        572 
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R-squared       0.219 
  
Kleibergen-Paap pvalue        0.1585 
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic        1.16 
Hansen J Statistic pvalue        0.5542 
Endogeneity Test pvalue       0.3792 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
X instrumented by UNESCO conventions in force 
XX instrumented by public health expenditure as a percent of GDP and women’s political rights 
XXX instrumented by the interaction of UNESCO conventions in force and public health 
expenditures as a percent of GDP 
 
 
Table 24 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Selection Model  
    
 
Log of Inflows of FDI 
   
BITs in force 0.00629 
 
(0.0190) 
PARCOMP 0.0293 
 
(0.196) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0137** 
 
(0.00629) 
Rule of Law 0.507 
 
(0.341) 
Log Population 2.165*** 
 
(0.803) 
GDP Growth -0.0186 
 
(0.0141) 
Life Expectancy 0.0804* 
 
(0.0421) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) 0.00224 
 
(0.0120) 
Inflation 3.88e-05 
 
(3.96e-05) 
Log GDP per capita 0.828*** 
 
(0.194) 
Democracy Dummy 5.313*** 
 
(1.327) 
BIT Signing Dummy 0.0895 
 
(0.738) 
  Selection Equation Results: Dependent Variable BIT Signing Dummy 
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  UNESCO Conventions in Force 0.0338** 
 
(0.0137) 
PTAs -0.0586 
 
(0.0428) 
Government Stability 0.157*** 
 
(0.0486) 
GDP Growth 0.0339** 
 
(0.0145) 
Log GDP per capita 0.138*** 
 
(0.0528) 
  Observations 399 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 25 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Additional Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
          
BITs in force -0.0136 0.00833 0.00669 -0.00115 -0.0112 
 (0.0185) (0.0178) (0.0237) 
(0.0198) (0.0190) 
PARCOMP -0.298* -0.280 -0.337* -0.138 -0.292 
 (0.180) (0.185) (0.179) 
(0.171) (0.182) 
BITs* 
PARCOMP 
              
0.0139*** 0.0120** 0.0141** 
 
0.0159*** 0.0174*** 
 (0.00495) (0.00510) (0.00705) 
(0.00526) (0.00551) 
Rule of Law -0.0137 -0.0180** -0.192 0.306 -0.0210** 
 
(0.00900) (0.00888) (0.257) (0.265) (0.00903) 
Log Population -0.0100 -0.138 3.502*** 1.477*** 0.195 
 
(0.251) (0.229) (1.094) (0.500) (0.299) 
GDP Growth 0.726 2.631*** 0.00415 -0.00381 2.221*** 
 
(0.743) (0.776) (0.0103) (0.00960) (0.791) 
Life Expectancy -7.45e-06 2.73e-05 0.0809** 0.100** 2.78e-05 
 
(5.06e-
05) (4.76e-05) (0.0378) 
(0.0390) 
(4.82e-05) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) 0.0107 0.00675 -0.0242*** -0.0103 0.00466 
 
(0.00921) (0.00869) (0.00897) (0.0113) (0.0102) 
Inflation 0.0649* 0.0773** 1.53e-05 2.84e-05 0.0740* 
 
(0.0345) (0.0319) (4.90e-05) (4.84e-05) (0.0394) 
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Log GDP per capita 0.221 0.689*** 0.627*** 0.930*** 1.002*** 
 
(0.161) (0.131) (0.157) (0.151) (0.149) 
Democracy Dummy -0.715 -3.227** -5.054** -0.635 7.876** 
 
(1.309) (1.523) (2.184) (1.164) (3.369) 
Time Trend 0.163***     
 (0.0392)     
Capital Account 
Openness  0.414***  
 
 
  (0.0822)    
Foreign Aid (logged)   0.166*   
   (0.0851)   
Internal Conflict    -0.0376  
    (0.0383)  
Workers’ Rights     0.00697 
     (0.106) 
Corruption     -0.0947 
     (0.0948) 
 
     
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 511 504 484 399 499 
R-squared 0.992 0.992 0.990 0.993 0.991 
Number of Countries 74 71 73 57 74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 26 Determinants of FDI Inflows: Strength of Enforcement Provisions in BITs 
      
BITs in Force 0.0262 -0.0176 
 
(0.0273) (0.0202) 
Enforcement Strength of BITs 0.383 -0.311 
 
(0.317) (0.246) 
BITs*Enforcement Strength 0.00936 0.00947 
 
(0.0173) (0.00832) 
Rule of Law 0.819*** 1.412 
 
(0.235) (1.058) 
Log Population 0.553*** 4.341** 
 
(0.0831) (2.028) 
GDP Growth 
 
0.0101 
  
(0.0279) 
 110 
Life Expectancy 
 
-0.0351 
  
(0.0473) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) 
 
0.00257 
  
(0.0202) 
Inflation 
 
0.00827 
  
(0.00731) 
Log GDP per capita 
 
2.151*** 
  
(0.614) 
Democracy Dummy 
 
-5.858 
  
(4.122) 
   Country Fixed Effects No Yes 
Decade Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 147 125 
R-squared 0.978 0.996 
Number of Countries 59 51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 27 Determinants of FDI Inflows:  BITs, Citizen Participation, and Formal Political Institutions 
      (1) (2) (3) 
        
BITs in force -0.0157 -0.0201 -0.0157 
 
(0.0194) (0.0183) (0.0247) 
PARCOMP -0.312* -0.236 -0.355** 
 
(0.180) (0.198) (0.179) 
BITs*PARCOMP 0.0201*** 0.0190*** 0.0165*** 
 
(0.00566) (0.00581) (0.00568) 
Veto Players 0.412 0.0737 
 
 
(0.322) (0.375) 
 BITs*Veto Players 
 
0.0178 
 
  
(0.0172) 
 Parties 0.202 
 
0.108 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.153) 
BITs*Parties 
  
0.00913 
   
(0.00760) 
Rule of Law -0.0295 -0.0146 -0.153 
 
(0.230) (0.212) (0.228) 
Log Population 2.535*** 2.459*** 2.695*** 
 111 
 
(0.661) (0.660) (0.816) 
GDP Growth -0.00524 -0.00438 0.00452 
 
(0.00938) (0.00934) (0.00925) 
Life Expectancy 0.0788** 0.0804*** 0.0868*** 
 
(0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0336) 
Oil Rent (% GDP) -0.00997 -0.00953 -0.0200** 
 
(0.00967) (0.00993) (0.00880) 
Inflation 3.03e-05 2.82e-05 2.16e-05 
 
(4.76e-05) (4.86e-05) (4.95e-05) 
Log GDP per capita 1.063*** 1.097*** 0.746*** 
 
(0.166) (0.163) (0.148) 
Democracy Dummy 1.058** 3.433*** 10.40*** 
 
(0.440) (0.741) (3.450) 
    Observations 452 452 511 
R-squared 0.992 0.991 0.992 
Number of countries 72 72 74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX D 
Table 28 Countries in Sample in Surveys 
PEW Sample Countries ASES Sample Countries WVS Sample Countries 
Angola 
Bangladesh 
China 
Egypt 
Ivory Coast 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Pakistan 
Russia 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
 
China 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
 
Algeria 
Belarus 
Bosnia 
China 
            Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Table 29 Variable Descriptions for WVS Survey Models 
Variable Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. Definition Source 
Education 4.06 4 2.29 
1: not elementary  
2: elementary  
3: not technical  
4:  technical 
5: not secondary  
6: secondary  
7: not university  
World Values 
Survey 
(2000) 
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8: university 
GDP 
Growth 4.33 4.86 3.53 GDP growth (annual %) 
World Bank 
(2011) 
Governme
nt 
Confidenc
e 2.65 3 1.02 
“For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? The 
government” 
1: none at all 
2: not very much 
3: quite a lot 
4: a great deal 
World Values 
Survey 
(2000) 
Income 4.53 4 2.26 
Income Scale 
1: Low 
10: High 
World Values 
Survey 
(2000) 
FDI 
Inflows 
(% GDP) 2.18 0.80 4.07 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(percent of GDP) 
 
World Bank 
(2011) 
Life 
Expectanc
y 66.17 68.68 8.00 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number 
of years a newborn infant would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of 
its birth were to stay the same throughout its 
life. 
World Bank 
(2011) 
Male 0.49 0 0.50 
1 if male 
0 if female 
World Values 
Survey 
(2000) 
Rule of 
Law -0.42 -0.43 0.64 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
World Bank. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
(2010) 
 
Table 30 Variable Descriptions for Panel Regression Models 
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Definition Source 
Aid 18.18 18.44 1.92 
Net official development assistance and 
official aid received (current US dollars) 
(logged) 
Net official development assistance is 
disbursement flows (net of repayment of 
principal) that meet the DAC definition 
of ODA and are made to countries and 
territories on the DAC list of aid 
recipients. Net official aid refers to aid 
flows (net of repayments) from official 
donors to countries and territories in part 
II of the DAC list of recipients: more 
advanced countries of Central and 
World Bank 
(2011) 
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Eastern Europe, the countries of the 
former Soviet Union, and certain 
advanced developing countries and 
territories.  
BITs in force 3.72 1 8.77 
Total number of BITs that have been 
entered into force  
UNCTAD 
(2011) 
Capital 
Account 
Openness  -0.34 -1.15 1.44 
KAOPEN is based on the binary dummy 
variables that codify the tabulation of 
restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions reported in the IMF's Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Chinn and 
Ito (2009) 
Corruption -0.46 -0.58 0.74 
Control of Corruption captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. The 
range is from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values corresponding to better 
governance outcomes. 
World Bank. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
(2010) 
Democracy 
Dummy 0.42 0 0.49 
1 if ever a democracy, 0 otherwise 
Democracy is conceived as three 
essential, interdependent elements. One is 
the presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can 
express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Second is 
the existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of power by 
the executive. Third is the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily 
lives and in acts of political participation. 
Other aspects of plural democracy, such 
as the rule of law, systems of checks and 
balances, freedom of the press, and so on 
are means to, or specific manifestations 
of, these general principles. 
Marshall and 
Gurr (2008) 
FDI (% GDP) 2.46 0.84 6.39 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows as a 
Percent of GDP. See FDI inflows 
(logged) for further details 
World Bank 
(2011) 
FDI Inflows 
(logged) 17.53 17.62 2.79 
Log of Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (BoP, current US$) 
Foreign direct investment is net inflows 
of investment to acquire a lasting interest 
in or management control over an 
enterprise operating in an economy other 
than that of the investor. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvested earnings, other 
World Bank 
(2011) 
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long-term capital, and short-term capital, 
as shown in the balance of payments. 
Freedom of 
Assembly 0.56 0.71 0 
Right of citizens to assemble freely and 
to associate with other persons in 
political parties, trade unions, cultural 
organizations, or other special-interest 
groups. 
Scores: 
0: denied or restricted 
1: limited 
2: unrestricted CIRI (2008) 
GDP growth 4.07 4.28 7.65 
GDP growth (annual %) 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the 
products.  
World Bank 
(2011) 
GDP per 
capita 6.78 6.56 1.35 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars. (logged) 
World Bank 
(2011) 
Inflation 50.88 8.10 714.04 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  
Inflation as measured by the consumer 
price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods 
and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as 
yearly.  
World Bank 
(2011) 
Internal 
Conflict 7.94 8.25 2.76 
Assessment of political violence 
including the following components: civil 
war/coup threat, terrorism/political 
violence, and civil disorder. 
High values indicate low levels of 
conflict. 
Political 
Risk 
Services 
(2011) 
Legislature 1.52 2 0.79 
Mode of legislative selection 
0: no legislature 
1: non-elective legislature 
2: elective legislature 
Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and 
Vreeland 
(2009) 
Life 
expectancy 59.34 10.58 60.46 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the 
number of years a newborn infant would 
live if prevailing patterns of mortality at 
the time of its birth were to stay the same 
World Bank 
(2011) 
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throughout its life. 
Oil rent (% 
GDP) 7.88 0 16.31 
Oil rents (% of GDP) 
Oil rents are the difference between the 
value of crude oil production at world 
prices and total costs of production. 
World Bank 
(2011) 
PARCOMP 1.80 1 1.00 
The competitiveness of participation 
refers to the extent to which alternative 
preferences for policy and leadership can 
be pursued in the political arena. Political 
competition implies a significant degree 
of civil interaction. 
1 Repressed, 2 Suppressed, 3 Factional, 4 
Transitional, 5 Competitive  
Marshall and 
Gurr (2008) 
PARREG 3.62 4 0.67 
PARREG measures the degree of 
organization and institutionalization of 
participation. 
1: Unregulated 
2: Multiple Identity 
3: Sectarian 
4: Restricted 
5: Regulated 
Marshall and 
Gurr (2008) 
Parties 1.03 1 0.84 
Parties within the legislature 
0: Either no legislature or all members of 
the 
legislature are nonpartisan 
1: Legislature with only members from 
the regime party 
2: Legislature with multiple parties 
Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and 
Vreeland 
(2009) 
Political Risk 56.02 57.08 14.14 
Political risk includes the following 
components: government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment 
profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, 
religion in politics, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucracy quality. 
Higher values indicate lower political 
risk. 
Political 
Risk 
Services 
(2011) 
Population 15.25 15.44 1.99 
Total Population (logged) 
Total population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship--except for refugees not 
permanently settled in the country of 
asylum, who are generally considered 
part of the population of their country of 
origin.  
World Bank 
(2011) 
Rule of Law -0.60 -0.70 0.78 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in 
World Bank. 
World 
Governance 
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particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
Indicators 
(2010) 
Workers’ 
Rights 0.58 0 0.68 
Freedom of association for workers at 
their workplaces and the right to bargain 
collectively with their employers. 
Scores:  
0: severely restricted 
1: somewhat restricted 
2: fully protected CIRI (2008) 
Veto Players  0.12 0 0.24 
Measure of political constraints to policy 
change based on the number of 
independent branches of government 
with veto power over policy change. 
Henisz 
(2000) 
 
Table 31 Countries in Sample in Panel Regressions 
Algeria 
Angola 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
CAR 
Chad 
China 
Comoros 
Congo, DR 
Congo, Republic 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Malaysia 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nambia 
Nepal 
Niger 
Nigeria 
North Korea 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Qatar 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
UAE 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX E 
E.1 SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE 
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E.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Which of the following best describes the industry of the company for which you work?  (Check 
all that apply) 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting 0.0% 0 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 4.1% 2 
Utilities 0.0% 0 
Construction 4.1% 2 
Manufacturing 44.9% 22 
Wholesale Trade 6.1% 3 
Retail Trade 0.0% 0 
Transportation and Warehousing 0.0% 0 
Information 22.4% 11 
Finance and Insurance 6.1% 3 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 0.0% 0 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 16.3% 8 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 4.1% 2 
Administrative and Support and Waste Management and 
Remediation Services 0.0% 0 
Educational Services 0.0% 0 
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.0% 0 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 0.0% 0 
Accommodation and Food Services 0.0% 0 
Public Administration 0.0% 0 
Other (please specify) 11 
answered question 49 
skipped question 4 
 
Number Response Date Other (please specify) Categories 
1 Feb 26, 2013 5:34 PM law 
 2 Feb 26, 2013 3:01 PM software 
 3 Feb 12, 2013 4:17 PM Software & Telecom 
4 Feb 12, 2013 3:41 PM 
Engineering products (Software for Chip 
Design) 
5 Feb 12, 2013 2:22 PM Mobile service provider 
6 Jan 30, 2013 9:37 PM Semiconductor equipment 
7 Jan 30, 2013 8:01 PM Advertising and Media 
8 Jan 30, 2013 5:38 PM life science tools 
 9 Jan 30, 2013 4:36 PM Marketing/Advertising 
10 Jan 30, 2013 1:46 PM Analytical / Photonics 
11 Jan 30, 2013 1:30 PM Telecommunications 
 
2. What is your business title? 
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Answer Options Response Count 
answered question 49 
skipped question 4 
   Number Response Text 
1 vp corporate relations 
2 ceo 
3 Director of Operations 
4 VP, Corporate Finance 
5 attorney 
6 VP, Sales & Marketing 
7 owner 
8 Senior Vice President 
9 CEO 
10 President 
11 EVP, Sales 
12 Market Analyst 
13 CEO 
14 VP of Human Resources 
15 Kinetics 
16 Netformx 
17 President 
18 CTO 
19 VP Corporate Communications 
20 Marketing Coordinator 
21 Business Development Manager 
22 General Counsel 
23 Director of Intellectual Property 
24 Vice President, Marketing and Sales 
25 CEO 
26 Consultant 
27 Export Manager 
28 Global Chief Administrative Officer 
29 VP, Sales and Service 
30 EVP - Head of Sales 
31 Fellow 
32 Director of Investor Relations 
33 Director of Sales 
34 SVP CFO 
35 VP/CFO 
36 VP of Global Development 
37 VP of Marketing 
38 Manager of Investor Relations 
39 
Washington Labs and American Certification 
Body 
40 VP Business Development 
41 manager 
42 Director of Communications 
43 Managing Director and CEO 
44 HR Representative 
45 Manager 
46 Ocean Optics Inc 
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47 CFO 
48 EVP 
49 General Manager 
 
3. What is the annual revenue range of your company? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
< $1 million 2.1% 1 
$1 million < $5 million 4.2% 2 
$5 million  < $10 million 8.3% 4 
$10 million < $50 million 29.2% 14 
$50 million  < $100 million 6.3% 3 
$100 million < $500 million 25.0% 12 
$500 million < $1 billion 8.3% 4 
$1 billion < $2 billion 8.3% 4 
$2 billion < $5 billion 8.3% 4 
$5 billion or more 0.0% 0 
answered question 48 
skipped question 5 
 
 
4. What is the annual revenue range of your company from operations in developing countries? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
< $1 million 31.9% 15 
$1 million < $5 million 8.5% 4 
$5 million  < $10 million 17.0% 8 
$10 million < $50 million 21.3% 10 
$50 million  < $100 million 4.3% 2 
$100 million < $500 million 12.8% 6 
$500 million < $1 billion 2.1% 1 
$1 billion < $2 billion 2.1% 1 
$2 billion < $5 billion 0.0% 0 
$5 billion or more 0.0% 0 
answered question 47 
skipped question 6 
 
5. How many full-time employees does your company have? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
100 or less 30.6% 15 
101-500 employees 28.6% 14 
501-1,000 employees 8.2% 4 
1,001-5,000 employees 26.5% 13 
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5,001-10,000 employees 4.1% 2 
10,001-20,000 employees 2.0% 1 
20,001-30,000 employees 0.0% 0 
30,001-40,000 employees 0.0% 0 
40,001-50,000 employees 0.0% 0 
More than 50,000 employees 0.0% 0 
answered question 49 
skipped question 4 
 
6. Where is your company headquartered? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Canada 2.0% 1 
United States 93.9% 46 
Mexico 0.0% 0 
Central America 0.0% 0 
South America 0.0% 0 
Eastern Europe 0.0% 0 
Western Europe 4.1% 2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0% 0 
North Africa 0.0% 0 
Middle East 0.0% 0 
Russia 0.0% 0 
Central Asia 0.0% 0 
East Asia 0.0% 0 
South Asia 0.0% 0 
South East Asia 0.0% 0 
Japan 0.0% 0 
Australia or New Zealand 0.0% 0 
Other (please specify) 0 
answered question 49 
skipped question 4 
 
7. How would you best describe your role in the company's decision-making process to expand 
operations abroad? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
I am the sole decision maker 10.2% 5 
I make the final decision with input from staff/management 12.2% 6 
I help reach the final decision as part of a group/committee 36.7% 18 
I provide input toward the final decision 20.4% 10 
I have no input into the final decision 20.4% 10 
answered question 49 
skipped question 4 
 
8. Does your company currently have operations in developing countries? (NOT: Western 
Europe, United States, Canada, Australia, Japan) 
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Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 77.6% 38 
No 22.4% 11 
answered question 49 
skipped question 4 
 
9. Did your company have operations in developing countries in the past? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 10.0% 1 
No 90.0% 9 
answered question 10 
skipped question 43 
 
10. Why doesn't your company currently have operations in developing countries? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Weak property right protections 42.9% 3 
Political instability 0.0% 0 
Customer base is in developed countries 85.7% 6 
Government interference in business operations 0.0% 0 
Lack of judicial independence 14.3% 1 
Other (please specify) 5 
answered question 7 
skipped question 46 
 
Number Other (please specify) Categories 
1 lack of market size for data and information systems 
2 Not supported by the business 
3 
We do not have suffficient product volume to establish manufacturing operations in developing countries.  
We source product from existing manufacturers. 
4 Customer base not there 
5 
We retrenched to the USA only during the financial crisis, and have not yet expanded back into the  
developing world. Our footprint in 2007 was 11 countries.  
We have a small revenue stream from these "old" operations, but have not yet ventured abroad again. 
 
11. The following is a list of authoritarian countries. In which countries does your company have 
operations? (check all that apply) 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Algeria 5.3% 2 
Angola 2.6% 1 
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Armenia 2.6% 1 
Azerbaijan 2.6% 1 
Bahrain 5.3% 2 
Bangladesh 5.3% 2 
Belarus 2.6% 1 
Bhutan 0.0% 0 
Burkina Faso 0.0% 0 
Cambodia 0.0% 0 
Cameroon 2.6% 1 
Central African Republic 2.6% 1 
Chad 2.6% 1 
China 57.9% 22 
Congo Brazzaville 0.0% 0 
Congo Kinshasa 0.0% 0 
Cuba 0.0% 0 
Djibouti 2.6% 1 
Egypt 5.3% 2 
Equatorial Guinea 0.0% 0 
Eritrea 0.0% 0 
Ethiopia 0.0% 0 
Fiji 2.6% 1 
Gabon 0.0% 0 
Gambia 0.0% 0 
Guinea 0.0% 0 
Haiti 0.0% 0 
Iran 2.6% 1 
Iraq 2.6% 1 
Ivory Coast 0.0% 0 
Jordan 7.9% 3 
Kazakhstan 2.6% 1 
Kuwait 7.9% 3 
Laos 0.0% 0 
Libya 2.6% 1 
Madagascar 0.0% 0 
Mauritania 0.0% 0 
Morocco 2.6% 1 
Mozambique 2.6% 1 
Myanmar (Burma) 0.0% 0 
Nigeria 2.6% 1 
Oman 2.6% 1 
Papua New Guinea 0.0% 0 
Qatar 5.3% 2 
Russia 15.8% 6 
Rwanda 0.0% 0 
Saudi Arabia 15.8% 6 
Singapore 36.8% 14 
Somalia 0.0% 0 
Sri Lanka 0.0% 0 
Sudan 0.0% 0 
Sudan 0.0% 0 
Suriname 0.0% 0 
Swaziland 0.0% 0 
Syria 2.6% 1 
Tajikistan 2.6% 1 
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Tanzania 0.0% 0 
Togo 0.0% 0 
Turkmenistan 2.6% 1 
United Arab Emirates 15.8% 6 
Uganda 0.0% 0 
Uzbekistan 2.6% 1 
Venezuela 5.3% 2 
Vietnam 5.3% 2 
Yemen 0.0% 0 
Zimbabwe 0.0% 0 
My company does not currently have operations in any of 
these countries 28.9% 11 
answered question 38 
skipped question 15 
 
12. Did your company have operations in authoritarian countries in the past? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 0.0% 0 
No 100.0% 11 
answered question 11 
skipped question 42 
 
13. Why doesn't your company currently have operations in any authoritarian countries? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Weak property right protections 20.0% 2 
Political instability 20.0% 2 
Customer base is in developed countries 90.0% 9 
Government interference in business operations 40.0% 4 
Lack of judicial independence 30.0% 3 
Other (please specify) 2 
answered question 10 
skipped question 43 
 
Number Other (please specify) Categories 
1 Lack of business requirement (production in Mexico) 
2 
Not enough of a market, and/or too difficult to provide remote 
services 
 
14. What is the annual revenue range of your company from operations in authoritarian 
countries? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
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< $1 million 4.5% 1 
$1 million < $5 million 31.8% 7 
$5 million  < $10 million 22.7% 5 
$10 million < $50 million 36.4% 8 
$50 million  < $100 million 4.5% 1 
$100 million < $500 million 0.0% 0 
$500 million < $1 billion 0.0% 0 
$1 billion < $2 billion 0.0% 0 
$2 billion < $5 billion 0.0% 0 
$5 billion or more 0.0% 0 
answered question 22 
skipped question 31 
 
15. Please choose one authoritarian country selected in question 9. Please type 
the name of this country in box below. 
Answer Options Response Count 
  24 
answered question 24 
skipped question 29 
   Number Response Text 
1 China 
2 China 
3 China 
4 Saudi Arabia 
5 China 
6 Singapore 
7 China 
8 China 
9 China 
10 China 
11 China 
12 Singapore 
13 Singapore 
14 China 
15 china 
16 China 
17 China 
18 China 
19 China 
20 China 
21 Singapore 
22 China 
23 Venezuela 
24 singapore 
 
16. Currently, how risky to the following dimensions of your business is having operations in [Q15]? 
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Answer Options Not Risky 
A 
Little 
Risky 
Somewhat 
Risky 
Very 
Risky 
Extremely 
Risky 
Don't 
Know 
Not 
Applicable 
Response 
Count 
Establishment of 
Property Rights 5 5 6 1 1 0 4 22 
Property Right 
Security 7 5 6 2 1 0 2 23 
Contract Security 5 5 6 2 1 0 3 22 
Intellectual Property 
Right Security 5 6 4 4 3 0 1 23 
answered question 23 
skipped question 30 
 
17. Currently, how valuable to ensuring secure property right protections are the following for your 
company in [Q15]? 
Answer 
Options 
Not 
Valuable 
A Little 
Valuable 
Somewhat 
Valuable 
Very 
Valuable 
Extremely 
Valuable 
Don't 
Know 
Not 
Applicable 
Response 
Count 
Bilateral 
Investment 
Treaties 
1 3 5 2 2 2 3 18 
Elected 
Legislature 4 2 0 2 3 2 5 18 
Stable 
Political 
System 
0 1 3 2 9 0 3 18 
Democracy 4 1 1 3 2 1 6 18 
Labor 
Organizations 8 2 0 1 0 1 5 17 
Business 
Associations 1 0 5 5 3 0 4 18 
Freedom of 
Association 3 0 2 4 1 3 5 18 
Local Citizen 
Support for 
Foreign 
Investment 
2 1 7 4 1 0 3 18 
Independent 
Court System 4 0 1 3 6 0 4 18 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
18. Currently, how valuable to ensuring profitable operations are the following for your company in [Q15]? 
Answer 
Options 
Not 
Valuable 
A Little 
Valuable 
Somewhat 
Valuable 
Very 
Valuable 
Extremely 
Valuable 
Don't 
Know 
Not 
Applicable 
Response 
Count 
Bilateral 
Investment 
Treaties 
2 6 4 3 2 0 1 18 
Elected 
Legislature 6 4 3 0 1 2 2 18 
Stable 
Political 1 2 4 7 3 0 1 18 
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System 
Democracy 6 2 1 3 1 1 4 18 
Labor 
Organizations 8 5 1 0 0 1 3 18 
Business 
Associations 0 5 3 3 5 0 2 18 
Freedom of 
Association 2 3 1 4 2 3 3 18 
Local Citizen 
Support for 
Foreign 
Investment 
1 5 4 1 6 0 1 18 
Independent 
Court System 3 4 3 2 3 1 2 18 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
19. Currently, how valuable are bilateral investment treaties signed by [Q15] in signaling this 
country's commitment to liberal economic policies? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Not Valuable 16.7% 3 
A Little Valuable 16.7% 3 
Somewhat Valuable 44.4% 8 
Very Valuable 11.1% 2 
Extremely Valuable 5.6% 1 
Don't Know 5.6% 1 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
20. In [Q15] in the past five years, how often does your company work with the following organizations? 
Answer Options Every Day 
Once 
a 
Week 
Once 
a 
Month 
Once 
a Year 
Don't 
Know 
Not 
Applicable 
Response 
Count 
Labor Organizations 0 0 4 1 5 8 18 
Business Organizations 3 4 9 2 0 0 18 
Chambers of Commerce 0 0 7 3 4 4 18 
Non-Governmental 
Organizations 5 1 3 2 5 2 18 
Public Relations Firms 1 0 3 3 1 10 18 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
21. In [Q15] in the past five years, how often does your company engage in the following activities? 
Answer 
Options 
Every 
Day 
Once 
a 
Week 
More 
than 
Once 
Once 
a 
Month 
More 
than 
Once 
Once 
a 
Year 
More 
than 
Once 
Don't 
Know 
Not 
Applicable 
Response 
Count 
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a 
Week 
a 
Month 
a 
Year 
Negotiate 
Policies with 
Foreign 
Government 
Officials 
0 0 0 2 0 2 2 5 7 18 
Contact 
Foreign 
Government 
Officials for 
Policy 
Information 
0 0 0 4 2 2 1 3 6 18 
Provide 
Foreign 
Government 
Officials with 
Information 
on your 
Company 
0 1 1 5 1 5 0 2 3 18 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
22. Currently, how valuable are local business associations in providing the following services to your 
company in [Q15]? 
Answer 
Options 
Not 
Valuable 
A Little 
Valuable 
Somewhat 
Valuable 
Very 
Valuable 
Extremely 
Valuable 
Don't 
Know 
Not 
Applicable 
Response 
Count 
Information 
on Host 
Country 
Markets 
1 4 6 2 3 0 2 18 
Information 
on Host 
Country 
Regulations 
1 5 4 3 3 0 2 18 
Access to 
Government 
Networks 
2 3 4 2 3 1 3 18 
Access to 
Business 
Networks 
0 4 4 5 3 0 2 18 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
23. Currently, in [Q15], how strong is citizen support for foreign investment? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Very Weak 5.6% 1 
Weak 5.6% 1 
Moderate 38.9% 7 
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Strong 33.3% 6 
Very Strong 11.1% 2 
Don't Know 5.6% 1 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0 
answered question 18 
skipped question 35 
 
24. Please provide any additional comments or concerns. 
Answer Options Response Count 
  2 
answered question 2 
skipped question 51 
   Number Response Text 
1 
i have answered to the best of our ability, these are all educated guesses so 
completely self stated. 
2 
You should have provided a "Never" in some of the time frame questions.  We 
never contact foreign governments, chambers of commerce, etc. on a business 
level. Our only contact is when we ship through customs. 
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